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Professor Gerken uses Baker v. Carr as a case study for exploring
whether and when a minimalist strategy is likely to succeed in
voting cases. She makes two arguments. First, she suggests that
Baker and its progeny reveal the costs of atheoretical
decisionmaking. Without an intermediary theory for explaining
what the vague norm of equality should mean in the context of
malapportionment, the Court could describe equality only in the
most abstract terms. It could not identify sensible limiting
principles for the rule it was developing, nor could it defend its
own measure of equality against alternative measures. The result
was a doctrine plagued by inconsistency, incoherence, and the
unthinking adherence to a rigid, mechanical test. The second
argument offered in this Article concerns the causes of minimalism
in the malapportionment cases. Professor Gerken argues that it is
difficult for the Court to develop an appropriate intermediary
theory in voting cases because of the unique nature of the claims
that arise from the political process. For such claims, the
structures by which votes are aggregated and the ways in which
individuals align themselves are crucial for understanding most
harms. Both elements are difficult to square with a conventional
individual-rights approach and the familiar protections it affords
against judicial excess and error. Taken together, these two
arguments point up the irony of the Court's minimalist strategy in
applying one person, one vote. The Court's failure to articulate a
set of mediating principles seems to stem from the Court's fear of
abandoning the familiar protections against judicial mistake and
excess that accompany a conventional individual-rights approach.
It turns out, however, that an individual-rights approach without
an adequate intermediary theory equally lends itself to judicial
abuse.
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Many consider Baker v. Carr,' the topic of this Symposium, to be
one of the finest accomplishments of the Warren Court. Despite dire
warnings, the Court's entry into the political thicket seems to have
been an unmitigated success. It transformed the political landscape,
eliminating gross disparities in voting power across the country,
1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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seemingly without compromising its legitimacy in the eyes of most
Americans.
The Baker line exemplifies what Cass Sunstein has termed
"judicial minimalism." 2  These decisions embody "incompletely
theorized agreements"--fact-based holdings rendered without any
explanatory theory--or minimally theorized agreements which offer
only the narrowest theoretical grounds for the result reached To be
sure, these cases had a profound practical impact and first launched
the Court into the political thicket. They thus violated one tenant of
minimalism-that decisions be "narrow" in their application.4 But in
the long run the one-person, one-vote cases did little to define the
conceptual terrain in voting-rights cases. That is because the Court
failed to articulate an adequate mediating theory to explain what
equality meant in the context of voting. Consistent with a minimalist
approach, the Court reached a series of agreements on judicial
outcomes but offered no adequate explanatory theory regarding the
democratic process it was regulating.
The problem for the Court in implementing Baker was that the
foundational norm it was applying--equality-is too abstract to have
real meaning in the context of malapportionment.5 For example,
should "equal representation" mean equal population among
districts? An equally weighted voted? An equal share of a
2. See, e.g., CAss R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON
THE SUPREME COURT 3-5, 9-14 (1999) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN]. For a spirited exchange
on some aspects of minimalism not discussed here, see Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of
Theory, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 353 (1997) (arguing that judges should use a theoretical
approach in solving questions of law); Ronald Dworkin, Reply, 29 ARIZ. ST. L. 431
(1997) (responding to the criticisms of Posner and Sunstein); Richard A. Posner,
Conceptions of Legal "Theory". A Response to Ronald Dworkin, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 377
(1997) (critiquing Dworkin's approach); Cass R. Sunstein, From Theory to Practice, 29
ARIZ. ST. LJ. 389 (1997) [hereinafter Sunstein, From Theory to Practice] (same).
3. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 11. Sunstein seems to equate fact-based, atheoretical
decisionmaking and minimally theorized agreements, although the two may differ in
practice. See infra text accompanying notes 80-82.
4. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 10. However, the wide application of these cases
may stem in part from their minimalist theoretical underpinnings. See infra notes 115-21
and accompanying text.
5. Cf. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 329 (1973) ("Neither courts nor legislatures
are furnished any specialized calipers that enable them to extract from the general
language of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment the mathematical
formula that establishes what range of percentage deviations is permissible, and what is
not.").
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representative's attention? An equal share of political power? An
equal share of legislative success?6
Because abstraction is a common problem in equal protection,
we often see courts and commentators resort to what I term
"intermediary theories" or "mediating principles" in figuring out
what equality means in a given context. The most prominent are the
antidiscrimination principle7  and the subordination theory.'
Mediating principles function like a lens. They frame the question,
filtering out some facts and focusing on others, and they can lead us
to different conclusions about the constitutionality of the same
action.9
In the immediate wake of Baker, some members of the Court
tried to offer a set of mediating principles to give shape and content
to the emerging norm of equality in the context of apportionment.
As the one-person, one-vote doctrine developed, however, the Court
abandoned its efforts to develop such principles.10 Instead, the Court
6. Sandy Levinson further explores and develops these questions in his contribution
to this Symposium. See Sanford Levinson, One Person, One Vote: A Mantra in Need of
Meaning, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1269 (2002).
7. The antidiscrimination approach posits that individuals should not be treated
differently based on arbitrary criteria; on this view, the focus of the equal protection injury
is the motivation of the decisionmaker. For analyses of the antidiscrimination approach,
see Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 235,241,263-
313 (1971) [hereinafter Fiss, Fair Employment] (describing and critiquing this approach);
Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 107,
108-47 (1976) [hereinafter Fiss, Equal Protection] (same); Peter J. Rubin, Equal Rights,
Special Rights, and the Nature of Antidiscrimination Law, 97 MICH. L. REv. 564, 568
(1998) (same).
8. The subordination theory focuses not on intentional discrimination, but on actions
that have the effect of further disadvantaging a group that traditionally has been relegated
to an inferior position in society. For analyses of the subordination approach, see Ruth
Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1003, 1007-10 (1986) (developing and further refining the subordination theory);
Fiss, Equal Protection, supra note 7, at 147-70 (offering an early articulation of this
approach); Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword. Equal
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1976)
(discussing and further refining the subordination theory); David A. Strauss,
Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 935, 941-42 (1989)
(same); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2410, 2411-12 (1994)
(same).
9. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Morgan Kousser's Noble Dream, 99 MICH. L. REV.
1298, 1310-11 (2001) (book review) (offering an example of this analysis).
10. It is, of course, a bit artificial to speak about "the Court" as if it were a unitary
entity rather than a series of shifting coalitions of Justices over a two-decade period. It is
interesting, however, to note the continuity in the Court's approach over time. Indeed,
one can find examples of the problems I discuss in cases resolved by the Warren Court,
the Burger Court, and the Rehnquist Court. See infra text accompanying notes 70-73, 83-
91, 95-108, 185-87.
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either relied upon incompletely theorized agreements, never
articulating the mediating principles it was employing to define
equality in the malapportionment cases," or offered a minimalist
theory, the narrowest possible justification for the outcome it was
reaching.'
2
This Article makes two arguments. The first concerns the costs
of minimalism. While Sunstein has documented the benefits of the
incompletely theorized agreement, Baker and its progeny exemplify
its potential vices. Theories for applying the equality norm in voting
cases do not just permit judicial action; they guide and constrain
judicial discretion. Without an adequate theory for explaining what
equality should mean in the malapportionment context, the Court
could describe equality only in the most abstract terms. It could not
identify sensible limiting principles for the rule it was developing, nor
could it defend its own measure of equality against alternative
measures. The result is the type of opinion we see in Karcher v.
Daggett 3 in which the Court describes the injury in circular terms,
substitutes general paeans to individualism for concrete doctrinal
analysis, and defines equality in a rigid, mechanical way.
The critique of minimalism offered here thus differs from those
offered elsewhere and, indeed, shares many of the premises of
Sunstein's own approach.' 4 By "mediating theory," I do not refer to
an abstract philosophical argument, derived independently of the
cases before the Court and applied top-down. 5 I agree with Sunstein
that the power of legal argumentation derives, at least in part, from its
11. See infra text accompanying notes 60,66-67.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 61-65.
13. 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
14. While I share Richard Fallon's view that "incompletely theorized agreements"
represent "a second-best approach," RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE
CONSTITUTION 106-07 (2001), I do not dwell here on the benefits of transparency.
Further, in making this argument, I do not mean to suggest that "incompletely theorized
arguments" have no benefits. Indeed, as Cass Sunstein has amply demonstrated and as
Rick Hasen has argued in this Symposium, this approach can prove profitable in certain
circumstances. See Richard L. Hasen, The Benefits of "Judicially Unmanageable"
Standards in Election Cases Under the Equal Protection Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1469, 1473
n.9 (2001). For example, I agree with Hasen that ambiguity yields benefits in the early
development of a new line of equal protection analysis, and I do not read his essay as
disagreeing with the point I make here-that the Supreme Court should work to clarify
and develop the doctrine once there has been time for experimentation and development
in the lower courts.
15. Thus, I do not offer what Judge Richard Posner would term a Dworkinian critique
of minimalism, see Posner, supra note 2, at 379-81, a characterization with which Dworkin
himself seems to disagree. See Dworkin, Reply, supra note 2, at 431-45.
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contextual, bottoms-up, analogical approach.16  In the spirit of
Sunstein's pragmatic approach, I offer the one-person, one-vote cases
as a case study for assessing whether and when minimalism is likely to
succeed in voting-rights cases; these cases provide a concrete example
of potential pitfalls to incompletely theorized agreements and
buttress Sunstein's own efforts17 to ascertain when a minimalist
approach should be employed.
The second argument offered in this Article concerns the causes
of minimalism in the malapportionment cases. Voting-rights scholars
of every stripe have analyzed inconsistencies in the Court's
theoretical approach to voting rights.19  The question that has
16. See Sunstein, From Theory to Practice, supra note 2, at 390-92, 395-97. Even
analogical reasoning, however, requires a theoretical framework for determining which
analogies work and which do not. Thus, while the approach offered here bears little
resemblance to Ronald Dworkin's "Philosopher's Brief," I think Dworkin is correct when
he states that "analogy without theory is blind. An analogy is a way of stating a
conclusion, not a way of reaching one, and theory must do the real work." Dworkin, In
Praise of Theory, supra note 2, at 371.
17. Sunstein himself readily concedes that "[t]hose who generally believe in
shallowness cannot reject the possibility that judges may have to get ambitious in order to
think well about some cases; hence, conceptual assents, involving increasingly ambitious
arguments ... may be desirable." SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 248; see also Sunstein, From
Theory to Practice, supra note 2, at 390 ("The notion of 'justificatory ascent' rightly signals
the fact that a judge may have to get ambitious in order to think well about some cases.").
Indeed, while Sunstein documents the many benefits to minimalism in what he terms his
"descriptive" account, he does not assert that this approach should be used in every case.
To the contrary, Sunstein acknowledges that there are circumstances in which a minimalist
approach is inappropriate and can result in a flawed jurisprudence. SUNSTEIN, supra note
2, at 50, 57-58, 262.
18. While it is not clear whether, and to what extent, Sunstein would disagree with the
arguments offered here, these claims would plainly be rejected by at least one prominent
election law scholar, Daniel Lowenstein, who provocatively argues that "the Supreme
Court has no theory of politics-and be thankful for small favors." Daniel H. Lowenstein,
The Supreme Court Has No Theory of Politics-And Be Thankful for Small Favors, in
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 245-66 (David K. Ryden ed.,
2000). In Lowenstein's view, the Supreme Court should not freeze one theory of the
political process into the Constitution. See id. at 264. I disagree with Lowenstein as to the
costs of atheoretical decisionmaking, see infra Part II, and I believe that the Supreme
Court is, in fact, choosing a theory when it adjudicates these questions and ought to be
explicit when it does so. See infra Part III.
19. For just a handful of examples, see LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE
MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING
DEMOCRACY 168-222 (2002) (critiquing the underlying assumptions and inconsistencies
of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on representation and race); Einer Elhauge, Are
Term Limits Undemocratic?, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 83, 101-02 (1997) (noting the Supreme
Court's failure to think about democracy in ruling on term limits); Richard L. Hasen, Do
the Parties or the People Own the Electoral Process?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 815, 815-41
(2001) (critiquing the Supreme Court's efforts to regulate political parties); Samuel
Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic
Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 646 (1998) (arguing that "the Court's electoral
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received less attention is: Why? Why does the Court so often fail to
adopt a coherent set of mediating principles in the context of voting
cases despite the doctrinal and institutional costs?
The second half of this Article provides at least a partial answer.
The unique nature of the claims that arise from the political process
makes it difficult for the Court to develop an appropriate
intermediary theory in voting cases. For such claims, the structures
by which votes are aggregated and the ways in which individuals align
themselves are crucial for understanding most harms.20 For this
reason, the types of mid-level intermediary theories likely to make
the most sense in the context of malapportionment are those that
embody a structural approach to voting claims. By "structural
approach," I mean a theory that is designed "to regulate the
institutional arrangements within which politics is conducted"' 21 rather
than to vindicate conventional individual harms. In the context of
voting, usually a structural approach also will entail judgments about
the aggregation of votes, thereby requiring a focus on groups that
further diverges from conventional individualist principles.
Because most sensible intermediary theories for applying the
equality norm to malapportionment claims would have embodied a
structural approach, these theories were unlikely to appeal to the
Court. Questions regarding political structures and group
preferences are precisely the types of inquiries the Court prefers to
avoid. And with good reason. Both are difficult to square with a
jurisprudence lacks any underlying vision of democratic politics that is normatively robust
or realistically sophisticated about actual political practices"); Pamela S. Karlan, Just
Politics? Five Not So Easy Pieces of the 1995 Term, 34 HOus. L. REv. 289,308-09 (1997)
(critiquing inconsistencies in the Court's decisions in its 1995 Term); Pamela S. Karlan &
Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1201, 1208-16 (1996) (making
a similar argument in critiquing the Shaw cases); Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery
and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 784, 831-43 (1985) (discussing
intermediate questions of political theory in relation to the law of bribery); Daniel R.
Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L. REV. 893, 897-
901 (1998) (exploring inconsistencies in judicial theories behind campaign finance reform);
Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of Political Parties: A Reassessment
of Competing Paradigms, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 777-96 (2000) (exploring
inconsistencies in the judicial conception of political parties). Jonathan Still has critiqued
-scholars for offering inadequately developed theories of equality, and he has provided six
overlapping criteria for judging political equality. See Jonathan W. Still, Political Equality
and Election Systems, 91 ETHICS 375,377-85 (1981).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 31-32 (discussing the limited nature of such
theories).
21. Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal
Protection from Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REv. 1345, 1346 (2001). For a
more detailed definition, see infra text accompanying notes 132-35.
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conventional individual-rights approach and the familiar protections
it affords against judicial excess and error.
Taken together, these two arguments regarding the costs and
causes of minimalism point up a serious flaw in the Supreme Court's
malapportionment jurisprudence. Whenever the Court decides the
outcome in a malapportionment case, it necessarily makes a judgment
about the nature of the democratic process. As I argue below, 2 the
one-person, one-vote doctrine is implicitly premised upon
assumptions about how political structures should aggregate group
preferences, and it therefore does not fit neatly into a conventional
individual-rights framework. While the Court has avoided
acknowledging that fact by offering a series of incompletely or
minimally theorized agreements in applying Baker, those agreements
have not saved the Court from making structural judgments. Instead,
the minimalist strategy has simply resulted in a jurisprudence that is
doctrinally incoherent, plagued with inconsistencies, and marked by a
- rigid preference for mechanical proxies.
The irony is that the Court's failure to articulate an adequate set
of mediating principles seems to stem from a felt need to adhere to a
conventional individual-rights approach. That desire reflects the
Court's fear of abandoning the familiar protections against judicial
mistake and excess that accompany this well-established
jurisprudential approach. Thus, while the best candidates for a
mediating theory in the malapportionment cases embody the types of
structural principles that the Court thinks are linked to discretionless
decisionmaking, it turns out that an individual-rights approach
without an adequate intermediary theory equally lends itself to
judicial abuse.
Part I describes the path not taken by the Court. It sketches four
possible intermediary theories the Court might have used to apply the
equality norm to malapportionment context. Part II discusses the
path the Court took. It analyzes the Court's failure to adopt an
adequate mediating principle in the malapportionment cases and
examines the costs of minimalism: the flawed jurisprudence that
resulted from the series of incompletely theorized agreements that
22. See infra Part III.B. Guy Charles has made a similar argument in his contribution
to this Symposium. He argues that the Court's substantive theory of democracy, while not
explicitly articulated by the Court, can be identified from the structure and context of the
Baker opinion. Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics:
Reflections on the Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1103 passim
(2002).
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Baker spawned. Part III turns to the source of the Court's minimalist
impulses in the malapportionment cases. It argues that one of the
reasons the Court failed to offer an adequate intermediary theory in
the malapportionment cases is that most, if not all, of the available
alternatives would have forced the Court to deal explicitly with
structural harms and group preferences, neither of which is easily
squared with a conventional individual-rights approach. This Article
concludes by identifying the link between the costs and causes of
minimalism. The Court resorted to incompletely theorized
agreements in order to avoid acknowledging the structural
assumptions undergirding one person, one vote. It did so out of
concern that a structural approach would lead to judicial excess and
error. It is ironic, then, that the jurisprudence that resulted from its
minimalist approach exemplified precisely the same flaws.
I. THE PATH NOT TAKEN
We often think of one person, one vote in terms of the doctrine's
two bookends: Baker v. Carr,2 in which the Court first held that
malapportionment claims are justiciable, and Karcher v. Daggett,24
which invalidated a redistricting plan due to tiny departures from
absolute population equality. Baker does little to flesh out the right
being vindicated; its primary concern is to overcome the justiciability
hurdle erected by Colegrove v. Green.- And Karcher illustrates what
seems to be the natural outgrowth of a deeply felt intuition that
numerical equality matters. Karcher seems logically unassailable, if
slightly formalistic in its approach.
This conventional perspective misses the debates that took place
in the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions rendered in the
wake of Baker, in which the Justices were wrestling with the
normative questions embedded in the path they had chosen. The
non-minimalist opinions offered in cases like Reynolds v. Sims 26 and
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly27 created the possibility-
admittedly an elusive one-that the Court would eventually develop
a rich theoretical justification for the one-person, one-vote rule.8
23. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
24. 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
25. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
26. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
27. 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
28. I thus agree with Sunstein that Reynolds v. Sims moves in the direction of being
"fairly deeply theorized," SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 17, for it at least begins to offer a
theory of voting to justify recognition of the one-person, one-vote injury. Baker's
2002] 1419
HeinOnline -- 80 N.C. L. Rev. 1419 2001-2002
1420 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
The overarching principle in each case was, of course, equality.
But as with other equal protection cases, members of the Court began
to experiment with several mediating theories to explain how the
equality norm articulated in Baker v. Carr should be applied in the
context of malapportionment. Below I briefly describe four such
theories: the lock-up theory, the group-based animus approach, the
qualitative representation theory, and the expressive harm
approach.29 What links all of these theories is a structural conception
of the harm rather than a focus upon individual rights. It is these
shared traits that ensured these theories would never be embraced by
the Supreme Court."
Before turning to these arguments, I should offer two caveats.
First, I do not intend to offer a psychoanalytic account of judicial
decisionmaking. In analyzing possible alternatives available to the
Court, I do not wish to suggest that its members were clearly
presented with this menu of choices or consciously chose to disregard
them. The analysis below is instead designed to show that the Court
could have developed some type of mediating principle for applying
the equality norm, as evidenced by the fact that some of its members
were doing so. These theories sketched out below also are intended
to provide illustrative examples of one of the main points of this
Article-that an intermediary theory can cabin and guide judicial
discretion, and that the Court's failure to theorize in this fashion
mattered. For purposes of my overall critique of minimalism's costs,
then, what matters is the absence of a mediating principle in the
Court's malapportionment jurisprudence, not whether the Court
adopted any of the specific theories I offer here.
Second, I do not mean to suggest that these theories offer a
robust, fully developed conception of what equality should mean in a
democracy. All of the theories I describe below concern a crucial but
fairly narrow aspect of democratic participation-voting-and each
theory would require significant development and analysis to offer a
progeny, however, ultimately failed to live up to this promise. As I explain in greater
detail later in this Article, infra text accompanying notes 59-68, the Court eventually
abandoned its efforts to provide a robust theoretical justification for its decision and
resorted either to atheoretical or minimally theorized decisions.
29. This list is by no means exclusive; it is designed merely to provide a sampling of
some of the questions dividing the Court at the time. It does, however, roughly map on to
the normative arguments offered in another contribution to this Symposium. See
Nathaniel Persily et al., The Complicated Impact of One Person, One Vote on Political
Competition and Representation, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1299 (2002).
30. See infra Part III.
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complete and comprehensive theory of democracy.3 Nonetheless,
the theories described below would at least have been adequate, in
the sense that they would be sufficiently robust to avoid the doctrinal
pitfalls I discuss in Part II2 In short, the arguments offered below
should be understood as a thought experiment of sorts: What would
Baker's jurisprudential world have looked like if the Court had at
least started down the path of developing a robust theory of
democratic participation and adopted mediating principles capable of
giving some content to the term equality in the context of
malapportionment?
A. The Lock-Up Theory
One possible theory emerging in Baker's wake was the lock-up
theory,3 3 which posits that a democratic system cannot function if a
majority (or, as in the malapportionment cases, an entrenched
minority) uses its power over the redistricting process to prevent
others from gaining a fair share of political power. This theory was
first promulgated in Baker itself by Justices Douglas and Clark,
whose concurrences expressed concern about "entrenched political
regimes." 34  The district court in Reynolds v. Sims modeled its
remedial plan on this view, redrawing district lines so as to "releas[e]
the stranglehold on the legislature sufficiently so as to allow the newly
elected body to enact a constitutionally valid" plan.35  And the
Reynolds majority itself averted to the "minority stranglehold on the
31. For example, theories regarding the aggregation of votes would tell us whether
opportunities for "democratic participation" are equal only if democratic participation
could be reduced to a single exercise, the act of voting. An expressive harm approach
would be the appropriate means for defining democratic equality only if democracy served
expressive values alone, for it offers no means for gauging whether substantive equality
has been achieved. Developing a comprehensive theory of democracy is beyond the scope
of this Article. For two recent efforts to do so, see GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 19, at
168-222; DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS: DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND
ELECTORAL PRACTICES IN THE UNrrED STATES (forthcoming 2002).
32. Because I do not want to overstate the comprehensiveness of these theories, I
generally refer to these mediating principles as "adequate" or "sufficiently robust."
33. For two recent attempts to develop this theory, see Issacharoff & Pildes, supra
note 19, at 644-52; Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment
Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 492-502 (1997). For an earlier articulation, see JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 120 (1980). For a
vigorous critique of Issacharoff, Pildes, and Klarman, see Lowenstein, supra note 18, at
260-63.
34. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 248 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 258-59
(Clark, J., concurring).
35. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,543 (1964).
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State Legislature" and the "frustration of the majority will."36 The
trio of Supreme Court decisions following on the heels of Reynolds-
Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, Roman v.
Sincock, and WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo-similarly raised concerns
about minority lock-up and the vindication of majority rule.37
B. The Group-Based Animus Approach
A second potential mediating principle found in the early one-
person, one-vote decisions is what I would term the "group-based
animus approach." The Court was aware at the time of Baker that
rural and urban residents voted differently.3 8 Differences in voting
patterns leave voters vulnerable to manipulation by self-interested
legislators. When groups vote differently, changes in the manner in
which votes are aggregated can affect the allocation of legislative
power and, thus, substantive electoral outcomes.39 Under these
conditions, apportionment always offers an opportunity for
intentional discrimination.
In the context of voting, however, "intent" is a slippery concept.
The malapportionment cases present a common paradox in voting
rights: the best reason for forbidding differential treatment-
differences in voting patterns-is also the best reason for allowing it.
What distinguishes redistricting cases from most traditional equal
protection claims is that differences in group preferences can
represent a legitimate basis for state action. Indeed, one of the main
purposes of redistricting is to facilitate effective vote aggregation by
grouping individuals together on the basis of shared interests,4 °
36. Id at 570, 576.
37. See Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 698 (1964) (describing the plaintiff's claim
that it was impossible to alter the existing population scheme because "the existing
legislative apportionment was frozen into the [state] [C]onstitution" and "the present
legislature was dominated by legislators representing the two less populous counties");
Md. Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 674 n.19 (1964) (describing
the "rural stranglehold" on the political process); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633,
653-54 (1964) (expressing concern about a "built-in bias against voters living in the State's
most populous counties").
38. Indeed, these cases were originally litigated as traditional equal protection claims
based on the assumption that these two groups had different interests. See WMCA, 370
U.S. at 191 (stating that the complaint alleged "geographical discrimination"); Baker, 369
U.S. at 273 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting the complaint as challenging a
"purposeful and systematic plan to discriminate against a geographical class of persons").
39. See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 1663, 1671-72 (2001).
40. See id. at 1677-79 (exploring these issues in greater depth); see also id. at 1677 n.46
(collecting numerous sources).
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whether individuals self-identify along racial, socio-economic, or
geographic lines.41
Because of these special attributes of districting, traditional equal
protection rules-which are preoccupied with intentional efforts to
distinguish among individuals-have little purchase in this context. If
the use of a classification is deemed a proxy for intentional
discrimination, many traditional districting values must be
jettisoned.42 Further, whenever a state intentionally groups voters to
facilitate adequate representation, it necessarily undermines the
political power of another group of voters. How, then, do we define
legitimate efforts to achieve a fair distribution of political power
within a polity and animus-based efforts to harm members of a
particular group?
One strategy is to mandate equal population among districts,
thereby creating what amounts to a prophylactic rule that prevents
severe examples of group-based animus while allowing for
appropriate nonanimus-based distinctions.43 Under this approach, a
state could create districts with some population deviations as long as
they are not so severe as to create the inference of animus or prevent
a particular group from fairly participating in the political process.'
41. See Karlan & Levinson, supra note 19, at 1216-20 (discussing the ways in which
voters align themselves and arguing that race represents an appropriate category of
political alignment that the state may recognize).
42. In the words of two scholars, "if 'at the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of
equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat citizens as
individuals,' then redistricting stabs at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment every
time." Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding in Voting
Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2276, 2292 (1998) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900, 911 (1995)). For further evidence of this claim, consider the difficulties the Court has
encountered in identifying what "communities of interest" may be recognized in the Shaw
line of cases. Compare Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 919-20 (1995) (adopting a narrow
view of racial community), with Lawyer v. Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 581-82 (1997)
(offering a broader view of racial community).
43. For a general discussion of the role of prophylactic rules in constitutional
adjudication, see David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 190 (1988). For a thoughtful effort to cast Shaw as a prophylactic rule to allow for
some race conscious districting while preventing excessive reliance on race, see Melissa L.
Saunders, Reconsidering Shaw: The Miranda of Race-Conscious Districting, 109 YALE
L.J. 1603 (2000).
44. One could envision a certain amount of flexibility built into this approach. For
example, one might create a high bar for measuring population equality when the State is
overpopulating districts containing sizeable populations of racial minorities out of a
suspicion that any act that harms racial minorities probably stems from racial animus. If
one takes a broader view of animus, one could do so simply based on the recognition that
self-interested politicians will undermine the interests of racial minorities even when
pursuing purely partisan aims, thereby exacerbating the effects of past discrimination. See
generally J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE AND THE UNDOING OF THE
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As with the lock-up theory, one can find hints that the Court was
thinking about the one-person, one-vote principle as a strategy for
deterring group-based animus while allowing for appropriate
differentiation among groups. These cases were initially litigated on a
theory of group-based discrimination against urban voters.45
Moreover, one of the few plans upheld by the Court was accepted
because of the "consistency of application and the neutrality of effect
of the nonpopulation" standards employed,4 6 both criteria that would
inform an animus-based inquiry. Similarly, some members of the
Court took care to make room for the state to draw nonanimus-based
distinctions among group members. For example, in Baker, Justice
Douglas argued that equal protection does not require "universal
equality" and emphasized that "there is room for weighting." 47
Justice Stewart likewise claimed that states should enjoy a " 'wide
scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of
citizens differently than others.' "I4 Further, some of the standards
offered for measuring equality might have been premised on
assumptions about the appropriateness of differentiating among
voters. For example, one could imagine the "arbitrary and
capricious ' 4 9 standard as a rough proxy that allows for differential
treatment among voters, provided the overall distribution of power is
not so skewed as to signal animus.
SECOND RECONSTRUCrION (1999) (offering an excellent historical analysis of the many
ways in which politicians manipulate and ignore the interests of racial minorities in pursuit
of their own political ends). Concomitantly, the courts might adopt a more generous
standard for apportionment plans that disadvantage voters on the basis of geography,
depending on one's views of how often this type of discrimination occurs.
45. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. As James Blacksher and Larry
Menefee have argued, there is an irony if the Court entered the political thicket on these
grounds. After all, the one-person, one-vote decisions, which were based on the dictates
of the Civil Rights Amendments, largely benefited white suburbanites. And they were
handed down at roughly the same time that the Supreme Court was doing little to aid the
intended beneficiaries of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment, racial minorities, who
suffered from significant animus-based efforts to dilute their votes. See James Blacksher
& Larry Menefee, At-Large Elections and One Person, One Vote: The Search for the
Meaning of Racial Vote Dilution, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 203, 204, 230 (Chandler
Davidson ed., 1984).
46. Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835,845-46 (1983).
47. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,244-45 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 266 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
425 (1961)); see also Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 386 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
("[A] State might rationally conclude that its general welfare was best served by
apportioning more seats in the legislature to agricultural communities than to urban
centers, lest the legitimate interests of the former be submerged in the stronger electoral
voice of the latter.").
49. See, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 258 (Clark, J., concurring) (demanding only that the
districting scheme exhibit "some rational design").
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C. The Qualitative Representation Theory
A third theory for explaining what equality should mean in the
context of voting is the qualitative representation theory. On this
view, equality in voting requires that a state provide constitutionally
effective representation to all voters.50
One can see hints of this aspirational approach in the early one-
person, one-vote opinions. For example, Reynolds proclaims that
representative government is in essence self-government
through the medium of elected representatives of the
people, and each and every citizen has an inalienable right
to full and effective participation in the political processes of
his State's legislative bodies.... Full and effective
participation by all citizens requires, therefore, that each
citizen have an equally effective voice in the election of
members of his state legislature.
Like the group-based animus approach, this theory for applying
the equality norm would likely take into account group differences
and allow for differential treatment to facilitate the effective
aggregation of preferences. But it would demand a far more robust
theory of the democratic process. Courts would have to define what
constitutes "effective representation," an endeavor that would
require them to look beyond election day to the dynamics of the
legislative process and representatives' day-to-day relationship with
their constituents.
D. The Expressive Harm Approach
The expressive harm approach represents a fourth alternative for
applying the equality norm in reapportionment cases. This theory
posits that courts should pay attention to the social meaning conveyed
by the population disparities in question, not the intention behind
them.52 On this view, the problem with a malapportioned districting
50. This theory suggests the limits of Jonathan Still's categories, for even his broadest
definition of equality is confined to assessing how many seats a group will elect in the
legislature, not the quality of representation group members ultimately receive. See Still,
supra note 19, at 384-85.
51. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,542 (1964).
52. For analyses of the expressive harm approach in the context of voting, see
generally Ellen Katz, 99 MICH. L. REV. 491 (2000) (discussing the role of constitutive and
expressive harms in Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000)); Frank Michelman,
Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: Voting Rights, 41 FLA.
L. REV. 443 (1989) (exploring expressive and constitutive values in the context of
exclusionary voting rules); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms,
"Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After
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scheme is the message of inequality conveyed by districts of unequal
size.
Here again, the early one-person, one-vote cases hint at this
theory. From time to time, the Court gestured at the notion that
population deviations signal a message of exclusion or disrespect. In
Reynolds, for example, the Court observed that "[t]o the extent that a
citizen's right to vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen. '53
Gray v. Sanders states that" 'the right to have one's vote counted' has
the same dignity as 'the right to put a ballot in a box.' -154 Similarly,
Justice Fortas's dissent in Avery v. Midland rests on an expressive
theory of voting:
Our cases hold that people who stand in the same
relationship to their government cannot be treated
differently by that government. To do so would mark them
as inferior, implying inferiority in civil society, or inferiority
as to their status in the community. It would be to treat
them as if they were, somehow, less than people.
55
Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993) (linking the expressive harm theory to Shaw
v. Reno); Saunders, supra note 43 (offering a Miranda-like defense of Shaw); Adam
Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 330 (1993) (linking a wide range of
voting claims to the expressive harm theory). For general articles on expressive harms, see
Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000) (providing a comprehensive account of
expressive harms in constitutional analysis); Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension
of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1 (2000) (further elaborating and developing an
expressive harm approach); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social
Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STuD. 725 (1998)
(arguing that courts make judgments regarding the expressive dimensions of government
action even when adjudicating claims about individual rights); Todd Rakoff, Washington
v. Davis and the Objective Theory of Contracts, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63 (1994)
(arguing for an objective standard for gauging intent that takes social meaning into
account); Symposium, The Expressive Dimension of Governmental Action: Philosophical
and Legal Perspectives, 60 MD. L. REv. 465 (2001) (featuring articles addressing whether
the expressive content of state action ought to have legal significance).
53. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 567; see also id. at 568 ("A citizen, a qualified voter, is no
more nor no less so because he lives in the city or on the farm."); cf Gray, 372 U.S. at 379-
80 ("The concept of 'we the people' under the Constitution visualizes no preferred class of
voters.").
54. Gray, 372 U.S. at 380 (internal citations omitted).
55. Avery v. Midland, 390 U.S. 474, 498 n.2 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting) (internal
citations and quotations omitted); see also Winkler, supra note 52, at 375-76 (finding an
expressive dimension in the one-person, one-vote doctrine). Even later Supreme Court
decisions occasionally picked up on this theme:
The personal right to vote is a value in itself, and a citizen is, without more and
without mathematically calculating her power to determine the outcome of an
election, shortchanged if she may vote for only one representative vhen a citizen
in a neighboring district, of equal population, votes for two.
Bd. of Estimate of New York v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688,698 (1989).
HeinOnline -- 80 N.C. L. Rev. 1426 2001-2002
COSTS AND CA USES OF MINIMALISM
In sum, the Supreme Court had at least four possible theories for
translating the equality norm announced in Baker. The next Part
examines the Court's failure to adopt any of them.
II. THE PATH TAKEN: THE COSTS OF MINIMALISM
Despite these early traces of a mediating theory for applying the
equality principle to the malapportionment cases, each failed to catch
hold. Some of these theories were rejected outright by the Court, as
the lock-up principle was in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assemby56
and the group-based animus approach was in Davis v. Mann.57
Others never developed into more than a rhetorical flourish in a
Justice's opinion, as in the case of the expressive harm doctrine and
the qualitative representation theory s
What is more interesting is that the Court never offered an
adequate alternative theory to replace them. Despite demands from
its own members to offer a sufficiently robust theory for deciding
what equality should mean in the reapportionment context,59 the
Court never did so.
The Court's strategy in the one-person, one-vote cases can be
characterized in two ways. One can view the Court's approach as
purely atheoretical decisionmaking; it simply abandoned earlier
efforts to offer a theory to justify its holdings.6° Instead, the Court
gave us only fact-based decisions without a theory to justify them.
56. 377 U.S. 713, 730-37 (1964) (dismissing the fact that a majority of voters in every
region of the state had voted for the malapportioned scheme on the ground that the right
in question was individual in nature).
57. 377 U.S. 678, 692 (1964) (dismissing the desire to "balance urban and rural power
in the legislature" as "an explanation [that] lack[s] legal merit").
58. Interestingly, some of these theories seem to have been accepted in the context of
other voting claims. For example, the lock-up theory does a good job of explaining the
Supreme Court's partisan gerrymandering standard, see infra note 109 and accompanying
text, and the expressive harm theory has been explicitly endorsed by some Supreme Court
Justices in Shaw. See infra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Lucas, 377 U.S. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("We are not told how or
why the vote of a person in a more populated legislative district is 'debased,' or how or
why he is less a citizen, nor is the proposition self-evident."); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 621 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court assumes, rather than supports, its
conclusion."); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964) (Clark, J., dissenting) (accusing
the Court of issuing an "ipse dixit"); Gray, 372 U.S. at 388 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(accusing the Court of ruling by "judicial fiat"); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300 (1962)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Talk of 'debasement' or "dilution' is circular talk. One
cannot speak of 'debasement' or 'dilution' of the value of a voter until there is first defined
a standard of reference as to what a vote should be worth.").
60. See Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 249-50 (agreeing that the Court never endorsed
a single theory in resolving the one-person, one-vote cases, although individual Justices
endorsed various theories).
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Alternatively, one can characterize Baker's progeny as minimally
theorized61 -the Court adopted some mediating theory to justify its
holdings, but it is a theory of the narrowest sort.62 On the latter view,
one might argue that the one-person, one-vote cases are concerned
with "a significant deprivation of equal individual access to the
political process"'63 due to dramatic differences in the weight accorded
to individual votes. The Court's decisions might also be explained by
the notion that equality requires that each representative serve an
equal number of constituents.6' Both theories are extraordinarily
narrow and individualist in their focus, something that would make
sense given the origins of the one-person, one-vote doctrine in the
debates surrounding justiciability in Colegrove v. Green and Baker.65
Although I think both characterizations of the Supreme Court's
decisions-as fact-based opinions without a theory or decisions
offering a theory of the narrowest sort-are reasonable, I mildly favor
the former. While the two narrow theories identified above certainly
could provide a mediating theory for defining equality in the one-
person, one-vote cases, the Court never explicitly articulated either
theory, even in cases where their invocation would have offered the
Court some refuge from the doctrinal difficulties described below. 66
Nor did the Court consistently adhere to either theory in practice. 67
61. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, ill HARv.
L. REv. 54, 103-05 (1997) (arguing in a different context that many of the Supreme
Court's tests for implementing constitutional norms reflect a "thin, minimalist conception
of the democratic process").
62. I am indebted to Dick Fallon and Sam Issacharoff for suggesting different variants
of this argument to me.
63. Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of
Political Fairness, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1643, 1652 (1993).
64. See Judith Reed, Sense and Nonsense: Standing in the Racial Redistricting Cases as
Window on the Supreme Court's View of the Right to Vote, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 389,
454-55 (1999) (identifying this issue as the source of the injury in one-person, one-vote
cases and criticizing this view); Memorandum from Lani Guinier, to Harvard Law School
Faculty, Racial and Political Synecdoche: Issues of Representation, (July 13, 2000) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review) (same). Such a mediating theory would, of course,
offer an extraordinarily thin conception of voting and political participation. See Karcher
v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 774 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) ("[N]o one can seriously
contend that such an inflexible insistence upon mathematical exactness will serve to
promote 'fair and effective representation.' ").
65. For a discussion of this debate, see infra text accompanying notes 207-24.
66. For example, both mediating theories would have provided the Court with a ready
answer when challenged with alternative theories of equality, such as the Banzhaf test, see
infra Part II.A, and therefore could have avoided defining the harm in circular terms.
Each might also have provided a limiting principle for the equality norm. Thus, if the
Court were preoccupied with the weight of individual votes, it surely would have allowed
for departures that fell below the margin of error in the census and thus reached a
contrary result in Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983). See infra note 67. Similarly, the
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For purposes of this Article, however, it does not matter how
these decisions are best characterized, for the critiques offered below
equally apply. Thus, regardless of whether one views the one-person,
one-vote cases as an example of atheoretical decisionmaking or an
effort to implement a narrow (and largely unarticulated) theory of
equality, Baker's progeny may still be termed minimalist. To borrow
Cass Sunstein's terminology, on either view the Court's decisions in
the area of malapportionment have been shallow, not deep; they
reflect "concrete judgments on particular cases, unaccompanied by
abstract accounts about what accounts for those judgments."
6
This Part argues that the Court's minimalist approach has had a
significant effect on the development of Baker's precepts.69 Part II.A
demonstrates that without an adequate mediating theory to flesh out
the equality norm, the Court's description of the injury became
circular, and it was unable to offer a tenable response to alternative
descriptions of the harm offered in Baker's wake. Part II.B
demonstrates that the absence of a sufficiently robust intermediary
theory made any pronouncement on subsidiary questions little more
Court might have sensibly concluded that minor population deviations would not
undermine the mediating value of equal constituent service and thus avoided equating any
departure from mathematical equality with an equal protection injury. See infra Part H.C.
Thus, whether one views Baker's progeny as a set of cases without a mediating principle or
as a line of decisions with a thin, but unarticulated, theory of voting equality, the critiques
outlined below still apply.
67. As Sam Issacharoff points out, if the Court's theory of equality in the one-person,
one-vote cases concerned dramatic differences in the weight accorded to individual votes,
that theory would "ma[k]e some sense" given the "magnitude of the malapportionment in
the early one-person, one-vote cases," but it is inconsistent with cases like Karcher v.
Daggett, in which the deviations in question were smaller than the margin of error for the
census, and with the Court's rhetoric regarding the fairness and effective participation.
Samuel Issacharoff, Introduction: The Structures of Democratic Politics, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 593, 595-96 (2000); see also Issacharoff, supra note 63, at 1652, 1657-58 (arguing that
"Baker and Reynolds drew the greatest strength from malapportionment claims so
dramatic that it was possible to compute meaningful, even shocking, disparities in
individual access to representation[,J" but concluding that this theory of equality cannot
justify the "inconsequential" disparities challenged in Karcher). The constituent service
theory of equality would similarly seem inconsistent with the Court's refusal to allow for
departures from absolute equality to fulfill other traditional districting criteria, many of
which are designed to facilitate the ability of representatives to service their constituents.
See infra Part II.B.
68. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 13.
69. Here I rely on examples of these trends rather than a full-length exegesis of every
decision rendered by the Court. The doctrine did not, of course, develop in a linear
fashion, and counterexamples exist. That is in part why I rely most heavily upon the later
decisions of the Court; cases like Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983), and Board of
Estimate of New York v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989), represent applications of the one-
person, one-vote doctrine in its maturity and thus seem a fair basis for criticism.
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than an ipse dixit, thereby making it easier for the Court to flip its
position on basic doctrinal questions. Part II.C argues that the
Court's minimalist strategy prevented it from devising sensible
limiting principles to the equipopulation rule. As a result, the Court
concluded that only rigid, mathematical equality could satisfy Baker's
mandate. Each problem points up the potential costs of minimalism
as a jurisprudential strategy.
A. The Court's Inability To Define the Harm in One-Person, One-
Vote Cases
One result of the Court's minimalist approach is that its
description of the one-person, one-vote injury became circular.
Without an adequate mediating theory for explaining what equality
should mean in the context of apportionment, the Court was reduced
to asserting that population deviations cause an injury because they
depart from the principle of one person, one vote. Its answer to any
question about the nature of the harm was, to borrow Justice Harlan's
phrase, the "tautology that 'equal' means 'equal.' "70
Consider, for example, the Court's inability to respond to an
alternative conceptual framework describing equality-the Banzhaf
test-in Board of Estimate of New York v. Morris.71 The Banzhaf test
assesses equality by measuring the power of an individual voter to
affect the outcome of a governing body's vote. It does so by
analyzing the power of each member of the governing body to cast a
tie-breaking vote, and then calculating the power of an individual
voter to cast a determining vote in the election for that member.72
When the parties in Board of Estimate presented the Court with this
new test for assessing equality, it was unable to explain why the
population measure that it had chosen was superior. The Court
merely asserted that
the personal right to vote is a value in itself, and a citizen is,
without more and without mathematically calculating his
power to determine the outcome of an election,
shortchanged if he may vote for only one representative
when citizens in a neighboring district of equal population,
vote for two.
73
70. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,590 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
71. 489 U.S. 688, 697-99 (1989).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 698.
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Put another way, population inequality became both the measure of
the harm and its normative justification.
The intermediary theories described above would at least have
offered the Court a tool for analyzing this question. The expressive
harm theory, for example, might have led the Court to dismiss
Banzhaf's functional approach. Under this view of equality, what
matters is the social meaning conveyed by the redistricting scheme.
Whether or not population deviations measure inequality in a
functional sense, the appearance of equality is what matters, and the
Court's adoption of a simple, easily understood measure of equality
seems defensible.
The more functional approaches described above-the lock-up
approach, the group-based animus theory, and the qualitative
representation theory-might have led the Court in a different
direction. Even if the Court were disinclined to accept a model as
complex as Banzhaf's, these theories might have pushed the Court to
reconsider whether population deviations were the best means for
measuring inequality. As the Court's remaining voting-rights
jurisprudence moved into the second generation of legal challenges, it
had become clear that districts of equal population could not
guarantee equally weighted votes.74  Population deviations in
apportionment seemed relatively unimportant when compared to the
power legislators wielded in districting, for legislators could
significantly undermine the power of urban voters (or any other
group) by maintaining perfectly apportioned districts while carefully
drawing district lines to pack or fracture city dwellers.75 As the Court
74. See Issacharoff, supra note 63, at 1650 (explaining that in the wake of Baker, "the
instrumental aspect of the equipopulation rule lost its vitality as the one-person, one-vote
rule became increasingly reified as the functional definition of what it meant for an
electoral process to be politically fair"). The first generation of voting-rights claims dealt
with direct and formal limitations on ballot access. The second generation of voting-rights
claims dealt with efforts to undermine the voting power of racial minorities through the
strategic drawing of district lines. See Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The
Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1077,
1093-94 (1991) (describing the need for and development of the second-generation voting
claims); Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The
Transformation of the Voting Rights Process, 90 MICH. L. Rnv. 1833, 1839-40 (1992)
(same).
75. See, e.g., Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 750 n.12 (1964)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (noting that "with legislative districts of exactly equal voter
population, 26% of the electorate (a bare majority of the voters in a bare majority of the
districts) can ... elect a majority of the legislature"). Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725
(1983), exemplifies this problem. In Karcher, the Court invalidated a districting plan
because of minuscule population deviations but gave little heed to the obvious partisan
gerrymander New Jersey had ignored. See Issacharoff, supra note 63, at 1653-58
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itself observed in Gaffney v. Cummings, fair and effective
"representation does not depend solely on mathematical equality
among district populations," and "[a]n unrealistic overemphasis on
raw population figures, a mere nose count in the districts, may
submerge these other considerations and itself furnish a ready tool for
ignoring factors that in day-to-day operation are important to an
acceptable representation and apportionment arrangement."76 Thus,
an intermediary theory that recognized the significance of
aggregation and group affiliations in the political process might have
pushed the Court toward a dilution measure in place of, or in addition
to, a population deviation measure for defining inequality.77
One potential cost to minimalism, then, is that a narrow holding
agreed upon by the Court in one case eventually can take on a
normative force of its own. If one views Baker's progeny as decisions
without a theoretical anchor, then the Court's avoidance of theory did
not stop subsequent Justices from reading one into the cases. Judges,
deeply steeped in the legal culture, naturally look to prior cases to
discern the normative justification for their holdings. If the holding is
all there is to the decision, it may be treated as a normative
justification rather than merely a fact-specific, judicially agreed-upon
outcome. Thus, because the Court eschewed a mediating theory and
confined itself to narrowly defined outcomes in the early
malapportionment cases, the outcomes themselves took on undue
influence. Equal population became a normative principle justifying
recognition of the harm, not just the result mandated by the Court's
prior holdings. As a result, the Court's discussion of the one-person,
one-vote injury became circular, and it was unable to cope with
alternative definitions of inequality.
If one adopts the alternative view that the one-person, one-vote
cases are anchored in some theory, just an extraordinarily thin one,
78
(describing this problem); Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA.
L. REv. 1605, 1608 (1999) (same). Karcher thus vindicates Justice Powell's concern that
"exclusive or primary reliance on 'one person, one vote' can betray the constitutional
promise of fair and effective representation by enabling a legislature to engage
intentionally in clearly discriminatory gerrymandering." Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109,
168 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735,748-49 (1973).
77. The Court's early opinions seemed to conceive of the injury in terms of dilution,
see, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555, although that term was not yet a developed term of art.
Moreover, in at least one case the Court concedes that while "fair and effective
representation may be destroyed by gross population variations among districts ... such
representation does not depend solely on mathematical equality among district
populations." Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 748-49.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 62-65.
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then we would tell the story in a slightly different way. On this view,
the Court was unable to respond to competing definitions of equality
exemplified by the Banzhaf test because it began with such a narrow,
individualist theory of equality in the first place. By articulating too
thin a theory of equality in the early cases, the Court effectively
prevented itself from developing a more robust approach in
subsequent cases. The problem with the one-person, one-vote cases,
then, is not the absence of a mediating theory; it is that the mediating
theory chosen was not robust enough to deal with the doctrinal
puzzles that would eventually emerge from the equipopulation rule
chosen by the Court.
79
Both variants of the minimalist approach-atheoretical
decisionmaking or minimal theorizing-can result in the same
problem: an extraordinarily narrow view of equality is frozen into the
canon, often with nonsensical results. But the juxtaposition of these
two stories raises the question whether one ought to equate fact-
specific agreements with minimally theorized decisions. ° If we think
of the early one-person, one-vote cases as fact-specific agreements
that eschew a justificatory theory, then it would certainly be possible
to develop an appropriate mediating theory as the case law
developed. The problem is that the courts are unused to such an
approach and give the basic terms of the initial agreements-the fact-
specific holdings-undue normative weight, as I describe above.8' If,
however, we think of the early one-person, one-vote cases as
"minimally theorized agreements"-decisions relying upon the
narrowest theory available to justify the outcome-then the problem
with the Baker line is that the early decisions' reliance upon a narrow
theory prevented the Court from developing a more robust theory as
the case law developed. In both instances, judicial habits may lead to
unexpected consequences, for a minimalist approach-when filtered
through a deeply ingrained judicial tendency to look to prior
79. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Not by "Election Law" Alone, 32
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1173, 1180 (1999) (arguing that in the one-person, one-vote cases, "the
Warren Court opinions turned to the individual rights-compelling state interest standard
to break the restraints of the political question doctrine ... [b]ut in doing so, the Warren
Court locked into place conceptual tools that soon proved insufficient for the next
generation of cases"). As Sam Issacharoff has pointed out to me, we should not be
surprised that the Court felt little pressure to articulate a sophisticated theory to justify its
intervention in the early one-person, one-vote cases because the disparities initially
challenged were so extreme that a wide variety of theories would suffice, even rational
basis scrutiny. See E-mail from Samuel Issacharoff to Heather Gerken (Jan. 23,2002) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
80. I am indebted to Sam Issacharoff for raising this point.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
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precedent for reasons to guide future decisions-may end up
undermining the flexibility that minimalism is designed to
encourage.82
B. The Court's Inability to Maintain Doctrinal Consistency
Another problem stemming from the Court's failure to adopt an
adequate intermediary theory is doctrinal inconsistency. Consider,
for example, the Court's switch on the question whether traditional
districting criteria-compactness, preserving communities of interest,
or keeping political subdivisions intact-could justify departures from
absolute population equality for congressional apportionment. In the
wake of Baker, parties sought permission from the Court to deviate
from a strict equipopulation standard to achieve these other
redistricting goals. A request for an exception to a legal rule is, of
course, quite common. In order to decide whether to grant such an
exception, however, a court must consult the reasons for the rule to
determine whether the exception would be consistent with the rule.
The problem for the Court in the malapportionment cases,
however, is that it had never adequately articulated the reasons
behind the rule, so it was not possible for the Court to assess whether
these departures would be consistent with the notion of "equality." It
is not surprising, then, that the Court reached diametrically opposite
conclusions about the same question. In Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,83 the
Court rejected the state's effort to defend population deviations in
congressional districting plans as necessary to achieve other
districting criteria.84 All, said the Court, must be sacrificed to the
equality mandate. In Karcher v. Daggett,8 in contrast, the Court
announced-again, with little explanation-that a list of legislative
policies that "might justify some variance" in congressional districts
included the same criteria rejected in Kirkpatrick.86
A similar switch took place within four years of Kirkpatrick. In
1973, Mahan v. Howell7 abandoned Kirkpatrick's hard-line approach
and granted states considerable leeway in departing from the one-
82. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 4 (describing minimalism's attractive features).
This critique, of course, raises concerns about minimalism in practice, not in theory. Were
courts to abandon their jurisprudential habits, they would not look to prior decisions for
mediating theories and would, indeed, enjoy the benefits of the doctrinal flexibility
Sunstein identifies as one of minimalism's benefits.
83. 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
84. Id at 533-36.
85. 462 U.S 725 (1983).
86. Id. at 740.
87. 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
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person, one-vote rule. Mahan justified this departure on the ground
that the challenged plan was a state reapportionment plan, not a
congressional one.8 While that distinction is now well established in
the case law, if not widely endorsed by commentators, 89 it should have
seemed odd at the time given that, until Mahan, the Court articulated
the standards for state and congressional redistricting in similar
termsf0  Moreover, the three malapportionment cases decided
between Kirkpatrick and Mahan drew no such distinctions and relied
upon the two lines of decisions as if they were interchangeable.91
Even if one thinks these switches were due entirely to changes in
the Court's personnel, the absence of an intermediate theory likely
facilitated themf2  Either doctrinal choice in this situation-no
88. Id. at 324.
89. Most scholars think this justification is unpersuasive. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra
note 63, at 1651 (terming the distinction between state and congressional districting
"artificial"); Daniel Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative
Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 17 n.48 (1985)
(terming the Court's "official explanation" for the distinction between the two "no
explanation at all").
90. while Mahan characterized Kirkpatrick as mandating absolute population
equality for congressional districts, in fact both Kirkpatrick and Mahan articulated the
same basic test. Compare Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 530-31 ("[T]he 'as nearly as practicable'
standard requires that the State make a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical
equality. Unless population variances among congressional districts are shown to have
resulted despite such effort, the State must justify each variance, no matter how small.")
(citation omitted) (emphasis added), with Mahan, 410 U.S. at 324-25 ("We reaffirm
[Reynolds's] holding that 'the Equal Protection Clause requires that a State make an
honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly
of equal population as is practicable. We likewise reaffirm its conclusion that '[s]o long as
the divergences from a strict population standard are based on legitimate considerations
incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy, some deviations from the equal-
population principle are constitutionally permissible .... ") (citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
91. See Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 183-87 (1971) (making no mention of different
standards for state and federal apportionment); Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 111 (1971)
(citing Kirkpatrick and Wells, two cases involving federal plans, in invalidating a state
plan); Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 54 n.7 (1970) (articulating the
requirements of one person, one vote and citing precedent regarding state and federal
standards without distinguishing between the two).
92. I do not mean to overstate this point or suggest that a mediating theory would
have guaranteed judicial consistency. As Dan Lowenstein has pointed out, the notion that
only "jurisprudence guided by political theory ... leads to 'principled' results because the
theory-not the political preferences of individual judges-will determine the outcome of
cases" is belied by "the remarkable consistency with which the theory favored by a
particular scholar yields results in accord with the scholar's political ideology."
Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 253. Nonetheless, I do think a mediating theory plays some
role in promoting judicial consistency. First, such theories provide some guidance to
judges who do not have strong preferences on the question. Here, for example, one leaves
these cases with the impression that the Court simply did not know how to resolve these
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deviation allowed, or deviation allowed to fulfill traditional districting
criteria-seemed equally plausible given how abstractly the Court
had defined the constitutional norm. Indeed, without an adequate
mediating theory justifying the equal population rule, it was difficult
to assess whether and when an exception to the rule would be
appropriate. In each of these cases, the Court had nothing to do but
pronounce.
One of the intermediary theories described above would have
provided guidance to the Court or at least enabled it to offer more
than an ipse dixit to justify its choice. For example, the lock-up and
group-based animus approaches are premised on the assumption that
groups matter, that states ought to take into account regional
differences, communities of interest, and existing channels of
representation. Provided that the state had not used these values to
conceal discrimination or unduly undermine the ability of some
citizens to aggregate their votes, these redistricting values would have
been celebrated, not shunned. Had the Court instead adopted an
expressive harm approach, it would have wrestled with the question
whether fulfillment of traditional districting objectives could temper
the message of inequality conveyed by population deviations among
districts, as some have suggested is the case in Shaw.93
Here, then, is another potential cost to incompletely or
minimally theorized agreements. A sufficiently robust mediating
theory can constrain judicial discretion as much as license it. Its
absence makes it more difficult for the Court to achieve doctrinal
consistency because it deprives members of the Court of a common
baseline for determining when exceptions to a previously announced
doctrinal rule are appropriate. 94
questions, not that it was implementing some strongly felt desire to achieve a certain
result. Second, even when judges are, consciously or unconsciously, trying to implement
their preferred result, a mediating theory can make that task more difficult because it at
least creates a shared baseline for arguing about that result.
93. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 52, at 508-09.
94. Sunstein himself does not argue that minimalism cabins judicial discretion, at least
in this classic sense. While he links minimalism to some traditional practices designed to
promote judicial restraint, he classifies both sets of practices under the broader rubric of
principles "designed to limit the occasions for judicial interference with political
processes." SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 39. Thus, as Sunstein himself remarks,
"minimalism can be characterized as a form of 'judicial restraint,' but certainly not an
ordinary form." Id. at x. In Sunstein's view, minimalism promotes judicial restraint
because it prevents courts from resolving highly contested questions, thereby allowing
"continued space for democratic reflection." IM. at x, 28-32.
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C. The Inevitability of Karcher's Rigid, Mathematical Approach
A final potential vice of minimalism, at least in the context of
malapportionment cases, is that it can lead to the type of inflexible
rules that minimalism is supposed to avoid.95 Indeed, the absence of
an adequate intermediary theory all but guaranteed that Baker's
progeny would demand absolute population equality in redistricting
(or, to the extent that flexibility was allowed, as with state
apportionment, it ensured that the limiting principle the Court
offered would be unpersuasive). 6
Mechanical standards like the equipopulation rule are valuable
because they are easily administered. The problem in the
malapportionment cases is that the Court applied the rule in
unthinkingly broad terms, without regard to context. It thus became
"the sole arbiter of political fairness" 9 and lacked a sensible limiting
principle.
Without an adequate theory to explain why equality matters in
the context of apportionment, population equality became an end
unto itself rather than a means for achieving a well-functioning
democracy.98 In the Court's early malapportionment decisions, the
equipopulation rule was sometimes understood as a means to an end
rather than an end unto itself. In Kirkpatrick, for example, the Court
argued that the equipopulation principle represented a means "to
prevent debasement of voting power and diminution of access to
elected representatives."9 9  By the time Karcher was decided,
however, the means/end distinction had been all but eviscerated.
Population equality was equated with the end it once served: " 'equal
95. But see Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 258 (making the opposite argument).
96. See supra note 89.
97. Issacharoff, supra note 63, at 1651.
98. In criticizing this aspect of the Court's one-person, one-vote jurisprudence,
Michael McConnell argues that it was the "logic of the equal protection argument, and the
need for judicially manageable standards," that "drove the Court to more and more
radical insistence on precise mathematical equality." Michael W. McConnell, The
Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 103, 108 (2000). While I agree with McConnell that the Court has made a mistake
by not thinking about these cases in more structural terms, i.d at 108, I disagree with him
to the extent that he claims that this flaw in the malapportionment cases is "entirely a
product of conceptualizing this issue as one of equal protection." Id. at 114. As the
analysis below suggests, had the Court adopted an adequate mediating theory, it could
have come up with sensible limits to the equipopulation rule. See infra text accompanying
notes 109-14.
99. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969) (emphasis added). Elsewhere in
the opinion, however, the Court described equal population as an end unto itself, "the
basic premise of the constitutional command." Id at 533.
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representation.' "I' Population equality, not equal representation or
a well-functioning political system, was thus termed "the paramount
objective of [congressional] apportionment,"'' "the basic premise" of
the malapportionment doctrine,"° and "a value in itself."''°
As a result, it became difficult to offer a limiting principle for the
equal population rule. The Court was unable to explain whether and
when variations in populations would be acceptable. °4  That is
unsurprising. If population equality is an end unto itself, one cannot
argue that the broader democratic aims that the rule might have been
designed to serve should limit the requirement's reach. Any other
districting goal is destined to be classified as a "secondary
objective[]."' 05
Because the Court lacked the means to discern a limiting
principle for the rule it adopted, the Court was forced to make the
unconvincing claim we see in Karcher-that anything but perfect
numerical equality "would subtly erode the Constitution's ideal of
equal representation.' ' 0 6 The slippery slope argument discussed in
Karcher--"if we accept [a 0.7% deviation as de minimis,] how are we
to regard deviations of 0.8%, 0.95%, 1% or 1.1%?"107-- could not be
defeated. Similarly, the Court could not justify engaging in
100. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730 (1983) (announcing that the standard for
apportionment is "'equal representation for equal numbers of people' "); see also id. at
731 ("[A]ny standard other than population equality ... would subtly erode the
Constitution's ideal of equal representation."); id. at 732 (arguing that population
deviations necessarily represented "something less than equality").
101. Id. at 732-33 (emphasis added); see also Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842
(1983) (describing population equality as a districting "objective" rather than a means to
an end).
102. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 732.
103. Bd. of Estimate of New York v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 698 (1989). At times Justice
White's opinion for the Court in Board of Estimate hints at the notion that population
equality represents a means to an end rather than an end unto itself, see id. at 693-94, but
the opinion eventually returns to the assumption that population equality "is a value in
itself' and declines to endorse any potential limits upon the equality mandate. Id. at 698.
104. This observation not only holds true for the mathematical rigidity of the Court's
measure of inequality, but also its inability to explain which governmental structures
should be governed by that rule. For an in-depth analysis of the Court's failure to give
adequate consideration to the different models of democracy offered by local
governmental structures in the malapportionment cases, see Richard Briffault, Who Rules
at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 339 (1993).
105. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 739; see also id. (classifying political considerations as
belonging "to the second level of judicial inquiry"); id. at 730-33 (classifying other
redistricting goals as "secondary"); Brown, 462 U.S. at 842 (same).
106. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 731.
107. Id. at 732.
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contextual, case-by-case assessments. It had little choice but to
adhere rigidly to the mechanical rule."8
Had the Court adopted one of the intermediary theories outlined
in Part I, a limiting principle would have been discernable. Under the
lock-up theory, for example, population equality is a means for
preventing one group from holding a disproportionate share of
power. That theory would lead to a different definition of equality
than Karcher's, perhaps something resembling the standard
articulated in the partisan gerrymandering cases. 09 It also would
have allowed for exceptions to the rule, depending on the factual
context."0
Similarly, if the expressive harm theory were the Court's
mediating principle, we would end up with a less rigid rule than the
one announced in Karcher. The premise of Karcher was that precise
numerical equality was necessary because the state would take
advantage of any opportunity to "discriminate" against disfavored
citizens. Thus, if the Court allowed for a five percent deviation, the
bad actor state would automatically adopt a five percent deviation,"'
and the Court wished "to open no avenue for subterfuge.""' If the
objective social meaning of the state's actions mattered, not its intent,
the slippery slope argument employed in Karcher would not be
available and some basis would exist for adopting a limiting principle
for judicial intervention.
Finally, as noted above, if the Court adopted either the group-
based animus approach or the qualitative representation theory,
population equality would have been tolerated, even encouraged, to
108. See Richard H. Pildes, Diffusion of Political Power and the Voting Rights Act, 24
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119, 127 (2000) (reaching a similar conclusion).
109. In order to establish partisan gerrymandering, one must show intentional and
consistent degradation of voter influence when examined against the political process as a
whole. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986).
110. For example, the lock-up approach would have suspended the equal population
requirement in a case like Lucas, in which malapportionment was approved under a
statewide referendum with substantial majorities favoring malapportionment in every
region. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 717-18 (1964); supra note 56.
There seemed to have been little danger of lock-up in Lucas, as the majority was evidently
capable of changing the rules that undermined its power but chose not to do so,
presumably to vindicate other legitimate interests. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL.,
THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 10-15 (2d
ed. 2001).
111. See Karcher, 462 U.S. at 731 ("If state legislators knew that a certain de minimis
level of population differences were acceptable, they would doubtless strive to achieve
that level rather than equality."); see also Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969)
(expressing similar concerns about the motives and strategies of state legislators).
112. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 535.
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the extent it facilitated the effective aggregation of votes. The
former might examine this question using rough numerical proxies,
akin to Section 2's proportionality approach.1 The latter would
consider the aggregative aspects of voting but would also require
contextual assessments not only of the election process, but of what
takes place after election day. Neither, however, would move toward
the simplistic view of equality that underlies Karcher.
Here, then, is an unexpected consequence of a minimalist
approach. Although minimalism is intended to avoid rigid rules,115 it
can sometimes have the perverse effects of encouraging them. If one
thinks of the one-person, one-vote cases simply as lacking a mediating
theory, then atheoretical decisionmaking deprives the Court of a
mediating principle to justify a more flexible approach. If one thinks
of these cases as embodying the narrowest theory capable of
justifying the results in the Court's early decisions, then the Court
lacks a sufficiently robust theory to adapt to the new doctrinal
questions that inevitably arise in the wake of any ruling.
Karcher's rigidity thus calls into question whether Sunstein is
right to pair two maximalist habits--"broad rules and abstract
theories."1 6 The absence of a sufficiently robust intermediary theory
in the malapportionment cases pushed the Court toward a rigid per
se rule for defining equality. 117 That per se rule, in turn, deprived the
Court of the discretion to make nuanced judgments regarding
application of the equality norm. The one-person, one-vote principle
became a blunderbuss precisely because the Court lacked a
sufficiently sophisticated normative theory to make contextual
judgments about the health of the political process and to place
sensible limits upon the reach of the one-person, one-vote principle.
Minimalist theorizing, in short, helped ensure that the one-person,
113. See supra text accompanying notes 38-51.
114. See Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1000 (1994) (holding that no violation of
§ 2 can be found when "minority voters form effective voting majorities in a number of
districts roughly proportional to the minority voters respective shares in the voting-age
population").
115. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 8-10.
116. Id at 9.
117. As Sam Issacharoff has pointed out, "the logic of judicial review" also "pushed the
equipopulation principle to the fore." Issacharoff, supra note 63, at 1651. As I have
written elsewhere, see Heather K. Gerken, New Wine in Old Bottles: A Comment on
Richard Hasen's and Richard Briffault's Essays on Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
407, 417-23 (2001), I agree with Issacharoff that bright-line rules-which create the
appearance of neutrality and conceal the complex normative judgments embedded within
them-are especially attractive to judges intervening in the messy world of political claims.
See Issacharoff, supra note 63, at 1648-50.
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one-vote cases would violate another tenet of minimalism-that
courts should avoid rendering decisions that are "wide" in their
application."8
In this respect, the one-person, one-vote cases offer an
interesting perspective on the debate about administrability that has
dominated voting-rights jurisprudence since the Court first set forth
into the political thicket." 9 John Hart Ely famously quipped that
"administrability is [the doctrine's] long suit, and the more
troublesome question is what else it has to recommend it."'120 Surely
the Court felt hard-pressed to develop an easily administered
standard in implementing Baker given the questions raised by the
Baker dissenters about the justiciability of the underlying claim and
the courts' competence to resolve it.'2' The bright-line rule adopted
by the Court provided an answer to critics who worried about undue
judicial interference in the political process.
The one-person, one-vote cases at least call that assumption into
question. To be sure, bright-line rules and mechanical proxies limit
judicial discretion; they make it harder for judges to implement their
own preferences when applying the law, a value we should not
underestimate when judges get involved with the political process.
But bright-line rules may also result in more widespread judicial
interference in the political process than broad theories because only
the latter offer grounds for discerning sensible limiting principles and
making contextual judgments regarding application of the equality
norm. Put differently, if per se rules limit judicial discretion, they
limit courts' discretion not to intervene as much as they limit their
ability to act. Conceivably, there might have been less judicial
intervention in apportionment claims had the Court developed one or
more of the theories discussed in Part I.
I do not mean to suggest that theory is an all-purpose solution to
judicial excess. A theory is useful in this respect only if it can be
meaningfully linked to the concrete facts of a given case. Here,
118. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 10.
119. For a discussion of the origins of that debate in Colegrove v. Green and Baker v.
Carr, see infra text accompanying notes 207-24. I am indebted to Sam Issacharoff for
raising this point.
120. ELY, supra note 33, at 121.
121. See infra text accompanying notes 208-09, 214; see also Issacharoff, supra note 63,
at 1657-58 (arguing that Karcher exposed the shortcomings of the one-person, one-vote
doctrine because the administrability of the doctrine became "the reason for the adamant
preservation of the rule when the Court could no longer give it a functional justification").
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Sunstein's concern with abstraction and vague philosophy is
especially well-taken. If the theories the Courts employs are so
nebulous and vague that they provide no guidance to other courts,
they are probably more harmful than bright-line, easily administered
rules because they can license wide-ranging judicial intervention
without offering meaningful principles to guide and cabin judicial
discretion. That is precisely why courts, lawyers, and academics must
develop sensible intermediary principles capable of translating broad
abstractions like "equality" into the nitty-gritty details of judicial
decisions.'23
I also do not mean to suggest that each of the intermediary
theories would have answered every question raised by the one-
person, one-vote cases,124 nor do I mean to suggest that the Court was
confined to choosing one theory instead of a set of overlapping
theories.'2 But an adequate intermediary theory at least would have
provided a shared basis to start thinking about these questions and
offered a compass for the Court to chart a more sensible doctrinal
course. Baker's progeny thus suggests that the minimalist strategy
122. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 14-18.
124. For example, with the possible exception of the expressive harm principle, these
theories do not immediately signal an answer to the question in Burns v. Richardson, 384
U.S. 73 (1966), in which the Court wrestled with the question whether registered voter
data provided an appropriate baseline for measuring inequality. The Court has yet to
specify what population data should be employed to measure a one-person, one-vote
violation. See Chen v. City of Houston, 532 U.S. 1046, 1046 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (chastising the Court for failing to resolve whether legislatures
must use total population or citizen voting-age population data in assessing
malapportionment claims on the ground that "as long as we sustain the one-person, one-
vote principle, we have an obligation to explain to the States and localities what it actually
means"). One of the contributions to this Symposium provides an in-depth analysis of this
question. See Levinson, supra note 6, at 1282. For other efforts to resolve this question by
examining the underlying theory of the one-person, one-vote cases, see generally the
debate between Judge Kozinski and the majority in Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918
F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990), and Scot A. Reader, One Person, One Vote Revisited. Choosing a
Population Basis To Form Political Districts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 521 (1994).
125. In calling for the Court to adopt a mediating principle, I do not mean to suggest
that the Court needs to develop a single, unified theory of democracy of voting to resolve
all cases. I suspect that a set of overlapping theories reflecting a wide range of democratic
values may better serve the Court in adjudicating the many types of claims that arise in
this context. In this sense, I agree with those scholars who argue that the Court should be
cautious about enshrining a single, narrow theory of politics in the Constitution. See
Charles, supra note 22, passim; Michael A. Fitts, The Hazards of Legal Fine-Tuning, 32
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1121, 1123, 1134-35 (1999); Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 264.
Lowenstein and I disagree, however, as to whether it would be useful for the Court to
articulate and flesh out any theory or set of theories when it resolves cases involving
democratic rights. See supra note 18.
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sometimes has pragmatic costs that have not yet been identified
elsewhere, all of which have led to the accusation that Karcher,
drafted when the doctrine had matured for two decades, represents
"the Lochner of the voting-rights field."'126
III. THE CAUSES OF THE COURT'S MINIMALIST STRATEGY IN
VOTING CASES
The failure to provide adequate mediating principles does not
just plague the one-person, one-vote cases. As I have written
elsewhere, the same trend can be identified in the context of Section
2, the most recent iteration of the Shaw line, and possibly Bush v.
Gore.2 7 In each of these instances, we see the same problems evident
in Karcher: a circular description of the harm; an application of the
guiding principle (often equality) with little reflection upon the
normative premises underlying that principle or the ways in which
different contexts might favor alternative definitions of equality; and
a preference for mechanical rules and abstract pronouncements that
enable a court to avoid-or, rather, mistakenly think it is avoiding-
the difficult normative questions that an intermediary theory would
help address.
The most interesting question is: Why? Given the potential
institutional and doctrinal costs of minimalism, why does the Court so
often follow this all-too-familiar path in voting-rights cases?
One answer is that these questions are hard."2 Development of a
mediating theory for defining equality in apportionment cases would
require the Court to wrestle with difficult questions about the
political process: Are the preferences of rural voters and urban
voters different, and should the Court recognize this fact? To what
extent ought a majoritarian system recognize minority voices? How
does one gauge the social meaning of an apportionment plan? It is
not surprising that members of the Court not only shy away from
making these judgments, 29 but sometimes pride themselves upon
their agnosticism toward democratic theory."'
126. Pildes, supra note 108, at 127.
127. See Gerken, supra note 117, at 413-414.
128. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights To Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71
TEX. L. REv. 1705, 1725 (1993).
129. As Justice Frankfurter noted:
Apportionment, by its character, is a subject of extraordinary complexity,
involving-even after the fundamental theoretical issues concerning what is to be
represented in a representative legislature have been fought out or
compromised-considerations of geography, demography, electoral convenience,
economic and social cohesions or divergences among particular local groups,
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This Part proposes an additional explanation for why the Court
often relies on a minimalist approach in voting cases: the Court's
discomfort with the unique nature of voting claims. Hard questions
about the application of equality norms permeate equal protection
law. Evaluating the message a particular action conveys, deciding
how one "fairly" divides up social goods, and determining what
constitutes invidious discrimination-these are all questions that must
be resolved in most discrimination cases.
What makes voting-rights cases distinct is that they take place in
the context of the political process. Because of the way that process
works, groups-and the political structures through which their
preferences are aggregated-matter. An individual's best chance of
making her voice heard is by aggregating her vote with like-minded
voters. Any framework that ignores these concerns misses a
significant part of the story.1
31
For this reason, the most likely candidates for mediating theories
in many voting cases are structural in nature. By "structural theory,"
I mean one designed to "regulate the institutional arrangements
within which politics is conducted"132 rather than to prevent
communications, the practical effects of political institutions like the lobby and
the city machine, ancient traditions and ties of settled usage, ... and a host of
others.... [T]hese are not factors that lend themselves to evaluations of a nature
that are the staple of judicial determinations.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 323-24 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
130. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 893-94 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(arguing that courts should not recognize a harm that requires "resort to political theory"
and a "theory of the 'effective' vote"); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S.
713, 748 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion because "it
imports and forever freezes one theory of political thought into our Constitution");
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 590 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of
relying on "political ideology," not constitutional analysis); Baker, 369 U.S. at 300
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (warning against courts "choos[ing] among ... competing
theories of political philosophy"). For a discussion of the Court's claims of agnosticism,
see Gerken, supra note 117, at 414-415.
131. For a similar conclusion and a historical analysis of the relevance of groups to the
Fifteenth Amendment, see Vikram D. Amar & Alan Brownstein, The Hybrid Nature of
Political Rights, 50 STAN. L. REV. 915 (1998).
132. Karlan, supra note 21, at 1346; see also Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 19, at 645
(contrasting "individualistic conceptions of harm" with "questions about the essential
political structures of governance"); Daniel R. Ortiz, From Rights to Arrangements, 32
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1217, 1218 (1999) (noting the movement in election law scholarship
"away from a largely rights-based, individual-centered view of politics, to a more
pragmatic and structural view of politics as a matter of institutional arrangements"). For a
debate on whether it is appropriate for courts to adopt a structural approach to voting
cases, compare Bruce E. Cain, Garrett's Temptation, 85 VA. L REv. 1589, 1600-03 (1999)
(arguing against a structural approach), and CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER,
CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 168-211 (2001) (suggesting that the Court must
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traditional individual harms. To be sure, individual rights can be
derived from structural principles133 and structural principles can be
recast as individual rights. 34 But a structural theory addresses harms
that are, at bottom, injuries to the polity; it is designed to produce a
healthy, well-functioning democracy.135  A structural theory thus
departs from a conventional individual-rights framework, for an
injury to the polity is often difficult to recast as a concrete injury, let
alone a discrete individual harm.
Further, in the context of voting, a structural theory will usually
embody some judgments regarding the means by which one
institutional structure-the electoral system-aggregates votes.
These judgments, in turn, will require decisions regarding how voters
should be grouped. Thus, a structural theory for explaining what
equality means in voting-rights cases will differ from an individual-
rights approach in a second way. It will address the institutional
treatment of groups of voters, regardless of how those groups are
defined.
The malapportionment cases implicitly embrace this type of
structural approach, with its focus on nondiscrete harms and group
identity. It is therefore not surprising that the mediating theories
identified in Part I are basically structural accounts of voting.
Because the salience of political structures and group dynamics to
these theories makes the Court uncomfortable, the Court has shied
away from explicitly endorsing any of them, preferring instead to
offer minimally theorized agreements that do not make these
concerns explicit. While the Court purports to be applying a
carefully define when it will intervene in cases involving "the structure of democratic
institutions and processes"), with Pildes, supra note 75, at 1611-15 (supporting a structural
approach). For an analysis of the relationship between structural analysis and individual
rights outside of the voting-rights context, see Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy:
Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend the Future-Or Reveal the Structure of
the Present?, 113 HARV. L. REV. 110 (1999).
133. See Tribe, supra note 132, at 143-55 (describing the derivation of the individual
right to travel from constitutional structure).
134. I argue that the Court has done so in the voting context. See infra text
accompanying notes 188-95.
135. See Fredrick Shauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First
Amendment, 77 TEx. L. REV. 1803, 1814-16 (1999). Precisely for this reason some
commentators argue that the Courts should not be making such judgments. See, e.g.,
EISGRUBER, supra note 132, at 169-72 (arguing that courts are ill-adept at making
"comprehensive judgments about the fairness of the political system as a whole"). This
Article does not address these issues in depth because the Court has effectively resolved
the question by venturing into the political thicket. Indeed, as I argue below, in
adjudicating the malapportionment cases, the Court is necessarily making these types of
judgments, whether or not it is well-equipped to do so. See infra Part III.B.
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conventional individual-rights approach, however, its decisions
necessarily incorporate judgments about political structures and
groups. Minimalism, then, has allowed the Court to implement a
structural approach without acknowledging that it has taken such a
step.
Part III.A makes two points. First, many voting claims are
inherently structural and demand attention to an individual's decision
to affiliate along group lines. Second, the structural, group-based
aspects of certain voting claims make it difficult to fit them within a
conventional individual-rights framework. Part III.B links this
problem to the issues discussed in Parts I and II: the Court's failure
to adopt an adequate intermediary theory in the wake of Baker. It
argues that, despite their seemingly individualistic underpinnings,
one-person, one-vote claims hinge upon assumptions about how the
political system should aggregate group preferences. This Part
therefore posits that the Court's failure to adopt an appropriate
intermediary theory stems, at least in part, from the Court's
discomfort with the structural and group-based underpinnings of
malapportionment claims. Part III.C buttresses this causal claim by
offering concrete examples of the Court's discomfort with the
structural, group-based aspects of one-person, one-vote claims and by
identifying the strategies the Court has adopted to avoid dealing with
these concerns. This Article concludes by speculating that these
avoidance strategies reflect the Court's deep-seated concerns about
its competence to make structural judgments about the political
process and its fear of exercising power without the types of
constraints it has developed in dealing with conventional individual
rights.
A. Structural Claims Do Not Fit Easily Within a Conventional
Individual Rights Framework
1. The Salience of Groups and Political Structures to Voting Claims
One of the primary difficulties the Court has encountered in
fleshing out what equality means in the voting-rights context is that a
structural approach is needed for a full understanding of equal
protection. Because much of an individual's political power hinges
upon her ability to aggregate her vote with like-minded voters, a
strictly individual-rights approach-which focuses entirely upon the
treatment of a single person-captures just a subset of the
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discrimination that can take place. 36 In the context of race, for
example, it is not enough to guarantee every racial minority the right
to cast a ballot that is counted. That is because, when members of
racial groups vote differently, a state can disempower racial
minorities through the careful drawing of district lines-scattering or
packing members of a group so they cannot aggregate their votes
effectively. Accordingly, even when all individuals have equal access
to the polls, a state can "dilute" the vote of racial minorities by
manipulating the structures through which those votes are
aggregated. 137 Thus, as long as we agree that equality means that
fifty-one percent of the people should not decide things one hundred
percent of the time,' 38 equal protection requires us to worry about
vote dilution.
Recognition of an aggregative harm like dilution requires
attention not only to political structures, but a sensitivity to the role
groups play within them. Dilution cannot take place unless groups-
however they are defined-vote differently. 39 If, for example, whites
and African Americans prefer the same candidates and policies, we
would not worry about dilution.
136. Jonathan Still classifies this anemic view of equality as "universal equal
suffrage"-which he describes as "'one person, one vote' in a literal sense"--and the
"equal shares" theory, which means that "each person's share" of representation "is the
number of legislators divided by the total number of voters." Still, supra note 19, at 378-
79. As Still explains, neither view "relates the votes that are cast to the outcome of the
election," a fact that makes it a "peculiar ... criterion for determining the presence or
absence of political equality" because it does not take into account whether "all votes have
the same impact on the outcome of the election." Id at 379; see also Lani Guinier &
Pamela S. Karlan, The Majoritarian Difficulty: One Person, One Vote, in REASON AND
PASSION: JUSTICE BRENNAN'S ENDURING INFLUENCE 210, 218 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz
& Bernard Schwartz eds., 1997) (making a similar argument); Sanford Levinson,
Gerrymandering and the Brooding Omnipresence of Proportional Representation: Why
Won't It Go Away?, 33 UCLA L. REv. 257,266-67 (1985) (same).
137. See Gerken, supra note 39, at 1671-73.
138. As Michael Klarman has observed, "majority rule can take a variety of forms-
including, specifically, for present purposes, a majority's enjoying all of the political power
or simply a majority of it." Klarman, supra note 33, at 525.
139. If voting is not polarized, then a member of a given group of voters cannot claim
dilution because no one is consistently voting against her preferences. In the absence of
polarized voting, such a voter is no different from a person whose last name begins with a
"G." She may be an electoral minority, but there is no danger that people with last names
beginning with other letters of the alphabet will take advantage of their numbers and
consistently outvote her preferences.
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2. Structural Claims Do Not Function Like Conventional Individual
Rights Claims
As I have explored in greater detail elsewhere, the salience of
political structures and groups to voting claims makes it difficult to fit
them into a conventional individual rights framework.140 That is
because an equal protection claim challenging how votes are
aggregated necessarily hinges upon the treatment of other group
members (whether "group" is defined by geography, race, political
affiliation, or some other criterion).141 No individual can claim that
her vote has been diluted unless other members of her group have
been treated unfairly. In this sense, dilution claims resemble
segregation claims; one cannot tell whether an individual has been
segregated unless one knows whether other members of her group
have been distributed fairly through the challenged school system or
housing program.142
For this reason, while in the usual discrimination case one looks
to the individual to assess whether she has been harmed, one cannot
do so in assessing an aggregation claim like dilution. At least in the
context of a territorial-based, winner-take-all system, some voters are
always "harmed" in the sense that they cannot elect a candidate of
choice, so looking to the treatment of an individual voter tells us little.
Instead, the key to evaluating fairness in districting is deciding
whether that voter's inability to aggregate her vote effectively is due
to the distributional effects inherent in any winner-take-all,
territorial-based districting scheme (where some members of every
group are unable to elect a candidate of choice) or a skew against
members of her group.43 That question can be evaluated only by
examining the treatment of the group as a whole.'" If the group as a
whole can aggregate its votes as effectively as any other group, there
is no skew, and the individual voter cannot raise an aggregation claim.
If the group as a whole cannot aggregate its vote effectively, then an
individual voter-arguably even an individual voter who can elect a
candidate of choice in her own district' 45-may bring a claim of
dilution. Thus, in contrast to conventional individual claims, a
140. See generally Gerken, supra note 39 (arguing that vote dilution claims present a
special type of injury, one more suited to an aggregate rights approach than a conventional
individual rights approach).
141. See id. at 1681-89.
142. See iU at 1684.
143. See id. 1683-86.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1683-86,1725-26.
1448 [Vol. 80
HeinOnline -- 80 N.C. L. Rev. 1448 2001-2002
COSTS AND CAUSES OF MINIMALISM
structural challenge requires an examination of the districting plan as
a whole, not the treatment of individual voters.
This type of structural analysis of equality also tolerates, even
encourages, trade-offs in the political process that would be
unthinkable in a conventional individual-rights scheme.146  For
example, we do not worry when a group member in one district is
unable to elect her candidate of choice if members of the group as a
whole can aggregate their votes effectively. 147 Indeed, under a
structural approach, we would expect legislators deliberately to inflict
this "harm" on individuals-intentionally place some voters in a
district knowing that they will be consistently outvoted' 4 -in order to
help members of a different group aggregate their votes more
effectively, thereby achieving a fair result overall. Thus, individual
harms are disregarded in the name of group treatment in a way that is
hard to reconcile with conventional notions of individual rights.49
Because of the unusual nature of claims challenging the
structures by which votes are aggregated, the bread-and-butter
doctrines of a conventional individual-rights framework-standing,
class definition, remedy-are difficult to apply. For example, in a
jurisprudence that incorporates a structural definition of equality,
individual standing hinges upon the treatment of other group
members. Further, the harm that falls on the individual is
146. See id. at 1703-11.
147. Justice Blackmun acknowledged this dilemma indirectly when he warned that the
Court's one-person, one-vote jurisprudence tended to ignore the fact that:
[d]etais of districting are interrelated and it is not helpful to look at isolated
aspects of a statewide apportionment plan in order to determine whether a racial
or other improperly motivated gerrymander has taken place. Districts that favor
a minority group in one part of the State may be counterbalanced by favorable
districts elsewhere.
Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 427 (1977) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment); id at 428 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (stating that "piecemeal review of an apportionment plan may well be
misleading" when disparate effect is the only claim).
148. Two scholars have termed such individuals "filler people" and speculated that
these are the victims of the Shaw injury. See Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff,
Race and Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional Lines after Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 588, 601 (1993).
149. See Gerken, supra note 39, at 1717-43. Sandy Levinson takes a different view,
arguing that proportional representation measures are actually a manifestation of a strong
view of individual rights, and asserting that only "structural concerns" can limit this
principle. See Levinson, supra note 136, at 271-76.
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undifferentiated among members of the group.150 Both notions are
arguably in tension with conventional standing doctrine.5
Moreover, because the key to the injury is effective aggregation,
a court might well reach the counterintuitive conclusion that the class
of voters injured in a case involving aggregation should include
individuals who are able to elect a candidate of choice in their own
district-people who seem to suffer no concrete injury.152 After all, if
members of their group cannot aggregate their votes effectively, then
the representative elected by this subset of the class will not have as
many allies as she otherwise would in working to achieve the group's
substantive agenda. These voters therefore cannot aggregate their
voting power effectively at the legislative level, even if they can elect
their candidate of choice within their own district.
1 53
The remedy in aggregation cases is similarly hard to square with
our traditional view of individual rights. For example, the remedy in
a racial vote-dilution case-the redrawing of district lines-will never
ensure that every racial minority lives in a district where she is
capable of electing a candidate of choice. Instead, some of the voters
whose injuries are "remedied" will remain in districts where they are
consistently outvoted. 4
Finally, as noted above, these types of structural harms depend,
in large part, on assessing whether an individual can aggregate her
vote with like-minded voters. Recognition of the link between group
membership and individual preferences, however, is difficult to
reconcile with the antiessentialism principle, which posits that courts
should not make assumptions about an individual's preferences based
on her group identity.155 This principle, which is closely linked to
individualist tenets, raises questions about the natural outgrowths of a
structural approach to voting: the classification of individuals based
on group affiliation rather than individual voting patterns, and the
deliberate placement of individuals in districts where they cannot
150. See Gerken, supra note 39, at 1687-89.
151. Pam Karlan has also argued that current voting doctrine is difficult to square with
traditional standing analysis, although she gets there via a different analytical route. She
argues that because the Court has chosen "the atomized individual as the building block
for legislative districting[,J .... [V]irtually every apportionment produces some legally
cognizable injury to a virtually limitless class of plaintiffs." Pamela S. Karlan, Politics by
Other Means, 85 VA. L. REv. 1697,1718-19 (1999).
152. See id. at 1721-24.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 1714-24.
155. See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 148, at 615. See generally Bernard
Williams, The Idea of Equality, in MORAL CONCEPTS 153 (Joel Feinberg ed., 1969)
(offering a general defense of the antiessentialism principle).
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elect a candidate of choice in order to achieve a fair distribution of
power among groups.'56
B. The Court's Failure To Adopt an Intermediary Theory For
Malapportionment Claims
1. One-Person, One-Vote Claims as Structural Claims
Here, then, is one possible explanation for the Court's failure to
adopt an adequate intermediary theory in the one-person, one-vote
cases. Malapportionment claims are structural claims.'57 Like other
types of dilution claims, they arise when all voters have equal access
to the ballot but the political system is structured in such a way as to
prevent the effective aggregation of certain votes. 58 While we might
care about malapportioned districts for reasons other than
aggregation, 159 we must consider the possibility that population
disparities will be used to dilute votes, an injury that can be measured
only in the aggregate. In the words of Justice Powell,
[g]ross population disparities violate the mandate of equal
representation by denying voters residing in heavily
populated districts, as a group, the opportunity to elect the
number of representatives to which their voting strength
otherwise would entitle them. While population disparities
do dilute the weight of individual votes, their discriminatory
effect is felt only when those individual votes are combined.6 °
Malapportionment claims thus bear all of the hallmarks of
structural claims. For example, an individual's injury in a
malapportionment case hinges upon the treatment of other people-
those who reside in her district.'6' A voter is injured by
156. For the Court, concerns about essentialization are particularly more acute for
aggregation claims involving race. See Gerken, supra note 39, at 1727-35; Karlan &
Levinson, supra note 19, at 1216-20.
157. See Issacharoff, supra note 63, at 1644-45 (discussing the problem of diluting
minority votes through multimember election systems).
158. Gerken, supra note 39, at 1737; see also Barbara Y. Philips, Reconsidering
Reynolds v. Sims: The Relevance of Its Basic Standard of Equality to Other Vote Dilution
Claims, 38 HoW. L.J. 561,567 (1995) (drawing a similar conclusion).
159. For example, we might be concerned on expressive harm grounds. See supra text
accompanying notes 52-55.
160. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 167 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (second emphasis added); see also Amar & Brownstein, supra note 131, at 972-76
(tracing the group-based aspects of the one-person, one-vote claims); Richard Briffault,
Race and Representation After Miller v. Johnson, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 27-30, 60-63
(discussing the vote dilution doctrine).
161. Gerken, supra note 39, at 1737-38.
2002] 1451
HeinOnline -- 80 N.C. L. Rev. 1451 2001-2002
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
malapportionment whenever she cannot aggregate her voting power
effectively at the legislative level, even if she is able to elect a
candidate of choice in her own district.162 Conversely, a voter residing
in a districting scheme with equal district populations-where all
members of her group have been treated fairly--cannot claim injury
even if the voter herself cannot elect a candidate of choice. That is
because, as with other aggregation claims, proof of injury requires a
showing of skew against members of the group (defined here as
residents of the district in question). Finally, the remedy for one-
person, one-vote claims-equalizing population-will not guarantee
any individual voter the ability to elect a candidate of choice, yet
every voter's injury is deemed "remedied" by the new districting
scheme. That is because courts determine fairness not by examining
the state's treatment of a particular voter, but by examining whether
the districting scheme, overall, fairly distributes political power
among residents of different districts.
Further, as with other types of dilution claims, group
identification matters in malapportionment cases. The only relevant
difference between one-person, one-vote claims and traditional
dilution claims is that groups are defined along geographic rather
than racial lines. But the voter's injury is nonetheless evaluated based
on her group identity (here, membership in a geographically defined
group), not her individual voting preferences, thereby running us into
the essentialization dilemma identified above.
63
2. Counterargument
One might respond to these arguments by asserting that the
Court could and did resolve one-person, one-vote claims without
adopting a structural account of voting. On this view, while the Court
could have adopted a structural approach that took aggregation into
account, it chose instead a purely individualist model of voting rights
to resolve malapportionment claims and thereby ducked all of the
problems associated with adopting a structural approach.164
What this response fails to consider is that, at least as the
doctrine currently stands, one-person, one-vote cases are necessarily
premised on a theory of aggregation, whether or not the Court
chooses to acknowledge this fact. One person, one vote rests upon
162. See Karlan, supra note 128, at 1717 (offering the same analysis in defining the
harm in malapportionment cases). It should be noted, however, that Karlan classifies this
claim as a "governance claim" rather an "aggregation claim." Id. at 1717-18.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 155-56.
164. I am grateful to Bill Stuntz for bringing this argument to my attention.
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the assumption that territorial-based districting represents a
constitutionally acceptable means of districting. 165 A territorial-based
scheme, however, necessarily incorporates a structural theory
regarding the way votes should be aggregated. When a state chooses
to employ territorial-based districting, it rejects the notion that an
equally weighted vote for every individual is all that matters. Such a
scheme is premised on the view that a system in which fifty-one
percent of the people win all of the time is not the embodiment of
"equality."'166 The state therefore systematically undervalues the
weight of some individual votes-those who make up the fifty-one
percent majority and could therefore control all elections under a
popular vote or in a system of random districting-and overvalues the
votes of others by ensuring their effective aggregation. 67 Indeed,
single-member districts were first employed to facilitate the
aggregation of minority votes during the first half of the nineteenth
century,168 and this goal remains a fundamental principle guiding
redistricting today.69 The goal of a territorial-based scheme is
"equality," but it is equality defined in structural terms-fair
treatment of all groups, including electoral minorities-rather than
equality defined in purely individualist terms.
If the one-person, one-vote rule were designed to vindicate a
purely individualist definition of equality, it would forbid the use of
single-member districts and mandate a system in which every
individual vote is counted in the same way. That is precisely why
Justice Stewart had trouble figuring out "why the Court's
constitutional rule does not require the abolition of districts and the
165. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 909 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
decision to rely on single-member geographic districts as a mechanism for conducting
elections is merely a political choice.").
166. See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 756-57 (1964) (Stewart,
J., dissenting) (emphasizing the need to ensure adequate representation of electoral
minorities to avoid the danger that legislators will ignore them entirely and thus their
votes will be "diluted" in a meaningful sense); Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and
Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of the Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1589, 1634
n.172 (1993) (arguing that semiproportional voting systems represent groups and
individuals better than winner-take-all systems); Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive
Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. Rnv. 1413, 1483 n.251 (1991) (proposing that the
baseline for measuring fairness is proportionality, not winner-take-all).
167. As Richard Pildes has explained, "the very theory of districted elections.., is that
democratic institutions are best designed by ... fragmenting majoritarian domination.
Districted elections empower local minorities who would otherwise be swallowed up in a
system not self-consciously designed to ensure some representation of their interests."
Pildes, supra note 108, at 124.
168. Id. at 126-28.
169. Gerken, supra note 39, at 1680-81.
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holding of all elections at large."'7 For these reasons, the one-person,
one-vote principle-even when articulated in the anodyne terms of
Karcher-necessarily embodies assumptions about the way political
structures should aggregate votes.
171
Finally, to reconcile the one-person, one-vote claims with a
subsidiary aspect of a conventional individualist approach-the
Court's antiessentialism principle-one might argue that geography is
a neutral means of grouping voters, one that does not require
redistricters to make assumptions about individuals' identities based
upon their group membership. The problem with this argument is
that, whether or not geography is a better criterion for grouping
voters than race, socio-economic status, or political affiliation, the
choice to adopt a territorial-based scheme for aggregating votes
nonetheless reflects a judgment about which group affiliations matter,
as James Gardner's contribution to this Symposium makes clear.
72
Legislators do not district along territorial lines by chance; they
assume that individuals who live in the same area will share similar
interests. Indeed, not only do redistricters assume that geography
helps define certain types of group affiliations, but they often employ
it as a proxy for other types of group affiliations. For example, the
post-Founding generation adopted a territorial-based scheme to
170. Lucas, 377 U.S. at 751 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
171. One might respond that a system of territorial-based districting can be designed in
purely individualist terms. On this view, territorial-based districting is preferable to at-
large voting because it makes representation more manageable by ensuring that each
representative has a smaller group of individuals to service. While this argument works in
theory, it is inconsistent with the historical origins of the practice as well as the way that
districting is conducted today. Moreover, even if this were the normative justification for
territorial-based districting, such a system would still have structural effects. That is
because, unless voters are distributed randomly throughout the state, any districting plan
will systematically underweight or overweight the votes of some types of voters. The only
way to avoid this group-based skew would be postcard districting (creating districts
through the random distribution of voters rather than geography).
172. See James Gardner, One Person, One Vote and the Possibility of Political
Community, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1237 passim (2002). Gardner's essay also highlights a point
this Article neglects: while one person, one vote accepted territorial-based identities to
some extent, the doctrine also sets limits upon how much regional identities should matter.
Id. at 1241-42. Thus, Gardner explains that the Court's refusal to adopt a one-community,
one-vote approach moved us away from a territorial-based community identity toward a
more national, individualistic conception of political identity. Id. Richard Ford's work has
pushed these questions in a different direction by demonstrating that geography itself is
not a neutral concept but is intimately connected to issues of race. See generally Richard
T. Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional Formation and Racial Segregation, 49
STAN. L. REV. 1365 (1997) (contrasting the constitutional treatment of territorial defined
political subdivisions); Richard T. Ford, The Boundaries of Race- Political Geography in
Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841 (1994) (arguing that "political spaces" are often
racially identified).
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accommodate economic groups that would have been shut out of the
political process in an at-large system.73 Territorial-based districting
itself, then, presumes "acceptance of the idea of legislative
representation of regional needs and interests." 174
3. The Court's Rejection of Intermediary Theories That Are
Premised on a Structural Approach
If one accepts the view that one-person, one-vote claims are
structural claims requiring sensitivity to group preferences, this view
goes a long way toward explaining the Court's failure to adopt one of
the intermediary theories described above. After all, any sensible
theory for explaining how to apply the equality norm in the context of
malapportionment would likely make explicit the structural premises
underlying the doctrine.
For example, three of the most obvious candidates available to
the Court in the immediate wake of Baker-the lock-up approach,
the group-based animus approach, and the qualitative representation
theory-are structural in nature. They are premised on the
assumption, articulated by Justice Stewart, that "[r]epresentative
government is a process of accommodating group interests through
democratic institutional arrangements."175 These theories are largely
concerned with the structures by which preferences are aggregated,
not the treatment of individual voters. They are all premised on the
assumption that groups-here, geographically defined groups-
matter in the context of voting. And they would allow-even
encourage-the type of trade-offs between groups and individuals
that would raise eyebrows in the context of conventional individual
rights. 76 For these reasons, adoption of any such theory likely would
force the Court to acknowledge the inherent tension between the
one-person, one-vote injury and the conventional approaches to
standing, remedies, class, and essentialism that have long been
associated with an individual-rights framework.
1 77
173. Pildes, supra note 108, at 123-24.
174. Lucas, 377 U.S. at 750 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 749 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also id. at 751 (Stewart, J., dissenting)
("[T]hroughout our history the apportionments of State Legislatures have reflected the
strongly felt American tradition that the public interest is composed of many diverse
interests, and that in the long run it can be better expressed by a medley of component
voices than by the majority's monolithic command.").
176. See supra text accompanying notes 146-49.
177. See supra Part III.A.2. The qualitative representation theory would be structural
in an additional sense. Because it promotes equality by guaranteeing adequate
representation to all individuals, it would look not just to the structure through which
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While the expressive harm approach 78 is not "structural" in the
same sense as the other three theories described in Part I, it
nonetheless retains certain structural features that place it in tension
with a conventional individual-rights analysis. 7 9  As with the
aggregation theories outlined above, an expressive harm inquiry does
not focus on individual injury; rather, it is concerned with the broader
social meaning of the choices the state makes in organizing itself."°
In that sense, the expressive harm manifests itself in the aggregate; it
is what Justice Frankfurter would term "a wrong suffered by [the
state] as a polity.'
181
Because the expressive harm is, in this loose sense, structural, it
is difficult to identify the concrete injury an expressive message
inflicts upon an individual. The harm is either too nebulous to be
captured in conventional legal terms or undifferentiated among
members of the group or the polity as a whole. In the aggregate,
however, the harm is more readily identifiable and arguably more
concrete. For example, while it is difficult to explain why an
individual voter feels "that much less a citizen" when she learns that
she lives in an overpopulated district, it is easier to accept the
possibility that consistent malapportionment will gradually erode
public confidence in the political system and representative
government.18  Indeed, as Roy Schotland has argued in this
Symposium and as Judge Abner Mikva has asserted elsewhere,
votes are aggregated, but to the structures mediating the relationship between constituents
and their representatives. It would, in effect, examine the democratic process with a wide
angle lens, looking to any structural defect that inhibited the development of a robust,
interactive relationship between voters and those who represent them.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
179. See Gerken, supra note 39, at 1739-40.
180. See Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting Rights Law Now at War With Itself.? Social
Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REv. (forthcoming 2002).
181. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549,552 (1946).
182. Cf. Pildes, supra note 108, at 134-36 (explaining how expressive harms relate to
broader concerns about the proper functioning of government). In this sense, the harm in
malapportionment cases resembles the injury in those due process cases in which the
failure to provide adequate process did not change the ultimate result. As Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), makes clear, it is often difficult to explain how an individual
has been concretely harmed by the failure to accord her adequate process where the end
result would have been the same. Nonetheless, the Court has awarded nominal damages
even when a conventional individual harm cannot be established on the ground that "the
law recognizes the importance to organized society that those rights be scrupulously
observed." Id at 266. Put another way, while the due process injury to the individual may
be difficult to discern, one can envision the long-term harm to society that may occur when
due process is consistently ignored.
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before Baker malapportionment severely undermined the legitimacy
and vigor of state government in the eyes of many Americans. 83
If this analysis is correct, then an expressive harm approach
would be no more attractive to the Court than the other alternatives
sketched out above. It retains a focus on broad structural concerns
rather than conventional individual injury. As with those theories,
injury can be identified only in the aggregate, and the harm is neither
concrete nor discrete. An expressive harm approach thus departs
from a conventional individual-rights framework in many of the same
ways as the three aggregation theories identified above.
In sum, many, if not all, of the likely mediating principles for
applying the equality norm to malapportionment claims embody a
structural approach. These approaches were thus precisely the types
of mid-level intermediary theories that the Court, deeply enmeshed in
the tradition of individual rights, was least likely to adopt.'84
C. The Court's Reluctance To Adopt a Structural Approach
1. Evidence of the Court's Discomfort with a Structural Approach
One need not rely solely on the fact that the intermediary
theories described above are in tension with a conventional
individual-rights approach to conclude that their structural
underpinnings have deterred the Court from embracing them. Quite
a bit of evidence in the Supreme Court's malapportionment cases
supports this causal link, much of which I have already touched upon.
For example, the Court's resort to abstraction and vague individualist
principles in describing the one-person, one-vote injury provides an
obvious example of its discomfort with a structural approach. Each
time the Court is confronted with an effort to cast malapportionment
claims in structural terms, it either explicitly rejects the argument as
inconsistent with individualist principles'15 or defines the right so
abstractly that it effectively avoids dealing with such arguments.
186
183. Roy Schotland, The Limits of Being "Present at the Creation," 80 N.C. L. REV.
1505, 1512 n.26 (2002) (discussing Judge Abner Mikva's comments).
184. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 19, at 644-48.
185. In Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 24 (1975), for example, the Court insisted that
"citizens in districts that are underrepresented lose something even if they do not belong
to a specific minority group," fending off efforts to link one person, one vote to a theory of
vote aggregation without reflecting on the possibility that geography, like race,
represented a basis for forming a group identity. Similarly, in Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S.
725, 752 (1983), the Court insisted that malapportionment claims are conventional
individual rights claims because "[a] voter may challenge an apportionment scheme on the
ground that it gives his vote less weight than that of other voters; for that purpose, it does
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not matter whether the plaintiff is combined with or separated from others who might
share his group affiliation." To make clear the true source of its discomfort with this effort
to link malapportionment claims to an aggregation theory, the Court emphasized that
Baker and its progeny protected "individuals" and affected "groups only indirectly at
best." Id. That theme was echoed by Justice O'Connor, and then-Justice Rehnquist in
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 149 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring), in which they
distinguished one-person, one-vote claims from partisan gerrymandering claims on the
ground that "[tihe right asserted in Baker v. Carr was an individual right to a vote,"
whereas the "rights asserted in this case are group rights to an equal share of political
power and representation."
The Court's antiessentialist impulses-also closely linked to its preference for an
individualist approach-have also come to the fore in the malapportionment cases. The
most famous example is Justice Warren's aphorism that "[I]egislators represent people,
not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic
interests." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); see also id. at 579-S0 ("[N]either
history alone, nor economic or other sorts of group interests, are permissible factors in
attempting to justify disparities from population-based representation. Citizens, not
history or economic interests, cast votes."); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964)
("Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of people .... ").
186. Consider again the Court's response in Board of Estimate of New York v. Morris,
489 U.S. 688 (1989), to the Banzhaf test as a means for gauging whether a voter can
aggregate her vote effectively. The Court responded to this structural theory, which was
explicitly premised on assumptions about the importance of effective aggregation at the
legislative level, by invoking the language of individualism. Instead of debating whether
the equipopulation rule chosen by the Court better addressed the problem of aggregation
than Banzhaf's approach, the Court simply rejected his test on the ground that "[t]he
personal right to vote" is "a value in itself," and population inequalities "shortchangeo"
the individual. Id. at 698. Similarly, later in the opinion, the Court rejected an expert
witness's testimony, which focused on the political power enjoyed by geographically
aligned groups (that is, the power enjoyed by each borough representative), because his
argument was "inconsistent with our insistence that equal protection analysis in this
context focuses on representation of people, not political or economic interests." Id. at
699 n.5.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), provides another example of the Court's
reliance on individualist rhetoric to avoid making explicit the structural judgments
underlying one person, one vote. See Issacharoff, supra note 63, at 1652 (terming the
Reynolds Court's effort to "treat[] the one-person, one-vote rule as ... the definition of
equal individual rights in the political arena" a mistake because it "obscured [the] critical
point" that individuals would also "claim[] rights to effective use of the franchise based on
group identities"). In Reynolds, the Court was forced to concede that the
malapportionment cases might require a court to "restructur[e] ... the geographical
distribution of seats in a state legislature." Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561. It buried that
concession about the structural nature of the remedy within a lengthy tribute to the
individualist underpinnings of the right impaired. Thus, the Court wrote, a
malapportionment claim "'involves one of the basic civil rights of man,'" a right that is
"individual and personal in nature." Id. at 561-62 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 516 U.S.
535,536 (1942)).
Similarly, in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964), when
the Court was squarely presented with a defense based on the lock-up theory, the Court
immediately reverted to abstraction and individualist rhetoric. Despite evidence that a
majority of Colorado's citizens had voted to grant minority voters greater voice in the
legislature, the Lucas Court declined to stay its hand because "individual constitutional
rights cannot be deprived, or denied judicial effectuation, because of the existence of a
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Similarly, the Court's preference for a rigid, mechanical rule in
applying the one-person, one-vote doctrine has helped it avoid-or,
rather, think it is avoiding-the normative landmines at stake.'17 The
Court often employs rough proxies to adjudicate voting cases, and
rightfully so. But usually the Court develops the normative premises
behind the rough proxy before announcing it. In the
malapportionment cases, in contrast, the Court has offered little
explanation to justify the proxy it has chosen. Yet despite the
absence of a strong normative foundation, the mechanical test plays a
more prominent role in malapportionment cases than any similar test
in the context of voting. Its rigid application constitutes the bulk of
the Court's analysis in every case, even in instances when the
doctrinal question presented demands a return to the test's normative
underpinnings to assess whether its application is warranted. The
Court thereby avoids articulating the mediating principle it is
employing and thus avoids explicitly discussing its structural
underpinnings.
Interestingly, yet another common avoidance strategy employed
by the Court is to import structural principles about how votes should
be aggregated, sub silentio, into an individual-rights framework.
1 8
nonjudicial remedy." Id. at 736. In order to emphasize the individualist underpinnings of
the one-person, one-vote claim, the Court relied upon a classic individual-rights case-a
decision involving a challenge to a flag-saluting requirement-for the proposition that
"'[o]ne's right to life, liberty, and property ... and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.' " Id. (quoting W. Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,638 (1943)).
187. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983), provides a good example of how this
avoidance strategy works in practice. At first glance, the opinion in Karcher seems
straightforward. The Court begins its legal analysis by announcing that "equal
representation" means "equal numbers of people," Id. at 730 (internal citations omitted),
and the bulk of the case is devoted to a rote application of that rule. Yet the doctrinal
question presented in Karcher was whether the facts of that case justified a departure from
the mechanical rule. To make that assessment in the usual case, the Court would
articulate the normative premises of the rule and evaluate whether they held true in the
case before it. Karcher did not.
188. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 19, at 645 (noting the courts' "awkward
attempts to fold difficult questions of democratic politics and judicial review into the
conventional regime of rights-based constitutional and statutory law"); Pildes, supra note
75, at 1606 (offering other examples of judicial attempts to "assimilate[]" structural claims
"into the pre-existing structure of conventional constitutional rights adjudication"). Lani
Guinier and Pam Karlan have argued that Justice Brennan was self-consciously importing
structural concerns into the one-person, one-vote cases. They conclude that "[a]lthough
the Justice spoke in the language of individual and personal rights, his ultimate goal was a
political system in which voters enjoyed equal opportunities to share political power by
participating fully in the political process broadly understood." Guinier & Karlan,
supra note 136, at 214.
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The one-person, one-vote claims provide a good example of this
strategy, as do vote dilution claims and certain jury discrimination
claims. All of these claims are best understood as importing certain
assumptions about how the democratic process should function into
an individual-rights framework.189
When the Court attempts to import structural concerns into an
individual-rights framework, we end up with a hybrid right, which I
have elsewhere termed an "aggregate right."'19 An aggregate right
bears some resemblance to a conventional individual right. For
example, it is often possible to recast the structural harm in concrete
terms and to identify a discrete set of individuals injured by violation
of the structural principle in question. Nonetheless, because the
injury remains, at bottom, a structural harm, an aggregate right
cannot be fully reconciled with conventional approaches to standing,
class certification, and remedies. Thus, for these hybrid rights we may
see the Court measuring individual injury and assessing remedies in
group terms-doctrinal strategies that are inconsistent with a
conventional individualist approach but represent perfectly sensible
strategies for a structural approach. 9'
Aggregate rights, then, are a compromise of sorts. They
represent an effort to take into account structural assumptions about
the aggregation of votes without abandoning the trappings of an
individual-rights framework. But, like all compromises, they are
unsatisfying. The individual-rights focus may get in the way of fully
vindicating the structural principle justifying recognition of the
Outside of the voting context, Laurence Tribe has described the right to travel in
similar terms, noting that this individual right imports structural assumptions regarding
"how the federal system matches people with territorially-based state jurisdictions and of
how the political community to which each state government must account is determined."
Tribe, supra note 132, at 143. According to Tribe,
the right to travel ... was a convenient way to describe more than simply a
personal right not to be treated as an enemy in the states through which the
traveler passed, but a structural norm about the limits of what states could
threaten to withhold from those of their citizens who chose to exit, or from those
citizens of their sister states who chose to enter.
Id. at 147-49; see also iL at 154-55 (stating that Saenz "involved the elaboration of a
structural principle of equal citizenship more than the protection of an individual right of
interstate movement").
189. See Gerken, supra note 39, at 1727 (suggesting that the structural underpinnings of
dilution claims help explain the Court's inability to squeeze them into a conventional
individual-rights framework); Heather K. Gerken, Juries as Democratic Institutions
(forthcoming 2002) (making a similar argument regarding jury discrimination claims).
190. See Gerken, supra note 39, at 1667.
191. Id. at 1689-91.
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harm. 92 And the rights in question function differently in important
ways from conventional individual rights and therefore cannot be
squeezed into the Court's traditional doctrinal frameworks. 193
What is most interesting about aggregate rights for these
purposes, however, is the fact that the Court does not acknowledge
the crucial differences between aggregate rights and conventional
individual rights. As shown above, the Court has explicitly declined
to do so in the malapportionment cases,194 and it has similarly refused
to do so in the context of vote-dilution claims, even when squarely
presented with evidence of the tension between the two
approaches. 195 These cases suggest that the Court is both hostile to
structural arguments and clings to the security afforded by a
conventional individual-rights approach.
It is interesting to consider how the Shaw doctrine fits with this
general trend. At least in the early days of Shaw, some of the Shaw
majority's members explicitly endorsed an expressive harm theory.9 6
Moreover, as Pam Karlan has argued,' 97 Shaw and its progeny
vindicate a claim that is structural in roughly the same sense that
expressive harms are structural;19 8  rather than dealing with
conventional individual harms, these cases are preoccupied with "our
system of representative democracy." 9 9 Perhaps we should view
Shaw as an indication that the Court stands ready to embrace a
structural approach in voting.
This conclusion is undermined by what the Court has done since
these early flirtations with a structural approach. First, the Court
never acknowledged the structural nature of the injury, even while
embracing the expressive harm theory. To the contrary, the Court
attempted to apply the expressive harm doctrine as if it concerned a
traditional individual harm. For example, the Court has tried to limit
standing to assert Shaw claims to a discrete set of individuals even
192. See Pildes, supra note 75, at 1606 (arguing that the Court's conventional approach
"inappropriately atomizes or disaggregates the issues at stake in 'political rights' cases").
193. See Gerken, supra note 39, at 1717-21 (discussing the relationship between
individual rights and aggregate rights in the voting context); see also Issacharoff & Pildes,
supra note 19, at 645 (describing the "unsatisfying discourse about individual entitlements
and the quality of counterpoised state interests" in voting rights).
194. See supra Part III.C.
195. See Gerken, supra note 39, at 1689-743.
196. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 980-81 (1996) (plurality opinion); Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630,648 (1993).
197. See Karlan, supra note 21, at 1364; Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years:
Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw Era, CUMB. L. REv. 287,296-97 (1996).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 178-83.
199. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 650.
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though it cannot offer a coherent justification for doing so.2°° Here
again, we see the Court trying to squeeze what is, at bottom, a
structural injury into a conventional individual-rights framework.
Second, as the tensions between the structural underpinnings of
the expressive harm approach and the tenets of a conventional
individual-rights framework became more apparent, as with the
standing debate,201 the Court has gradually moved Shaw away from
an expressive harm approach and toward a more conventional-and,
not coincidentally, more individualist-conception of the harm by
defining the Shaw injury as the right not to be subject to a racial
classification °z Thus, even when the Court takes a small step toward
recognizing the structural nature of a voting claim, it quickly reverts
to the safety afforded by conventional individual-rights analysis.
In sum, when presented with evidence of the differences between
a structural approach and a conventional individual-rights framework,
the Court always seems to hew to the individual-rights approach,
often ignoring the doctrinal problems it has created and the
normative questions it has elided. The many strategies the Court has
used to dodge the structural implications of the one-person, one-vote
cases provide one example. The Court's insistence upon applying
traditional individual-rights doctrines to structural harms without
recognizing their hybrid status is another. 3 Both suggest that the
Court's preference for minimalism in the malapportionment cases
stems from a reluctance to embrace a structural theory of voting.
200. In Hays v. Louisiana, 515 U.S. 737, 744-45 (1995), the Supreme Court held that
only those who resided in the challenged majority-minority district had standing to raise a
Shaw claim. As a number of commentators have explained, however, if the injury in Shaw
is an expressive harm, then all voters in the districting scheme should be equally affected
by the injury and thus all would enjoy standing. See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 42,
at 2286; Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106
YALE LJ. 2505, 2539 n.122 (1997). Thus, the Court has resisted the diffuse, non-discrete
nature of the expressive harm that reflects its structural nature. See supra text
accompanying notes 182-84.
201. The structural nature of the expressive harm approach presumably explains why
the Court has encountered so much difficulty in reconciling the Shaw doctrine with
conventional individualist principles like standing. Indeed, numerous commentators have
wrestled unsuccessfully with this problem, and none has yet to offer a consistent theory
explaining the Court's approach to standing in Shaw. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Standing to
Challenge Pro-Minority Gerrymanders, 111 HARv. L. REV. 576,576-95 (1997); Issacharoff
& Karlan, supra note 42, at 2276-92; Karlan & Levinson, supra note 19, at 1226; Saunders,
supra note 43, at 1614; Note, Expressive Harms and Standing 112 HARV. L. REV. 1313,
1316-20, 1325-30 (1999).
202. See Gerken, supra note 39, at 1692-94.
203. See id. at 1698-743.
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2. Possible Reasons for the Court's Reluctance To Adopt a
Structural Approach
One final question remains: How do we explain the Court's
marked resistance to structural theories? The most likely explanation
for the Court's adherence to a conventional individual-rights
approach is that it fears the untrammeled exercise of judicial power in
the political arena.2" At least in theory, one benefit of an individual-
rights framework is that it embodies a set of limitations upon judicial
power. °5 Indeed, many of the doctrines that do not fit easily with a
structural approach-standing, class limitations, conventional
remedial principles-are doctrines designed to cabin the r6ach of
judicial power. Further, in adjudicating countless individual-rights
cases, the Court has developed a reasonably coherent set of principles
to guide its decisionmaking, principles that it can draw upon
whenever it encounters a new variant of an individual claim. Unless
and until scholars and lawyers offer the Court a new set of limiting
principles-a different set of mechanisms for cabining courts'
discretion and avoiding judicial error-the Court may prefer the
awkward compromise of purporting to apply individualist principles
in this context. At least that strategy seems to offer the security of a
tried and true system for limiting judicial power,206 even if it
undermines the coherence of the Court's decisions and makes it
harder to vindicate many types of voting claims.
204. For a recent take on these issues, see EISGRUBER, supra note 132, at 168-204.
Laurence Tribe draws a similar conclusion from the Court's constitutional jurisprudence
as a whole. See Tribe, supra note 132, at 137 (noting and critiquing the widely held view
that "the Court skates closest to illegitimacy when it infers personal rights from the texture
and tenor of the Constitution, locating those rights more in structure and in the spaces
between the lines than in any actual lines of text or in any specific and well-established
tradition"). In Tribe's view, the Court is most likely to infer individual rights from
structural arrangements when the source of those rights derive from the doctrines that
form the bread-and-butter of "structural" constitutional analysis-what Tribe terms "the
institutional and territorial organization of the system of separated and divided powers'--
separation of powers, federalism, the relationship among the states, and the like. Id. at
140-42.
205. I will not rehash the extensive literature regarding whether such doctrines truly
cabin judicial discretion other than to note that Mark Tushnet's contribution to this
Symposium should at least raise the question whether these doctrines are fully capable of
doing so. See Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The
Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REv.
1203 (2002). It does seem fair to maintain, however, that judges generally believe that
these doctrines cabin their discretion, which is all that is necessary to accept the premise of
the argument I am making here.
206. See Cain, supra note 132, at 1600 (warning that "the structural approach leads
inevitably to intrusive judicial involvement in states' political arrangements"). But see
Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 19, at 654-60 (making contrary argument).
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One piece of evidence supporting this speculation brings us back
to Baker itself: the battle over the justiciability questions raised in
Colegrove v. Green. 7 Colegrove's dire warnings about judicial entry
into the political thicket were premised, at least in part, upon fears
that the structural approach embodied in the Republican Form of
Government Clause 208 offered no judicially manageable standards2 9
Those concerns have deep roots in the Court's jurisprudence, dating
back at least to Giles v. Harris,10 in which the Supreme Court
declined to remedy blatant racial discrimination on the ground that
political rights were nonjusticiable a.2 1  And notice how the members
of the Baker majority responded to the concerns articulated in
Colegrove. They defended against these claims by arguing that the
Court was vindicating individual rights, not the structural concerns
behind the Republican Form of Government Clause.212 When
vindicating individual rights, the Baker majority pointed out to its
brethren, the Court need not fear judicial excess or error because a
well-developed system existed for adjudicating such claims.
Consider, for example, the standing discussion in Baker.
2 13
Standing is, of course, a familiar tool for cabining judicial discretion.
In order to defend against Colegrove's assertion that
malapportionment was "not a private wrong, but a wrong suffered by
[the state] as a polity"214 -a nebulous claim that the Court lacked
standards to resolve-the Baker majority repeatedly emphasized the
individualist underpinnings of the harm it was recognizing. It insisted
that the parties had "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends.
''21 5
207. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
208. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. As Michael McConnell writes, "[t]he essential difference
between the Equal Protection Clause and the Republican Form of Government Clause is
that the Equal Protection Clause is based on a theory of individual rights.... The
Republican Form of Government Clause is a structural or institutional guarantee...."
McConnell, supra note 98, at 107.
209. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,223-26 (1962).
210. 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
211. Indeed, Colegrove cites Giles for this proposition. Colgrove, 328 U.S. at 552. For
a general discussion of Giles v. Harris, see Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-
Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295 (2000) (attempting to return Giles
to the constitutional canon).
212. Justice Frankfurter discusses this legal dodge in his dissent to Baker, 369 U.S. at
299-300 (Frankfurther, J., dissenting).
213. Another good example of this strategy can be found in the passages from
Reynolds. See supra text and notes 185-86.
214. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 552.
215. Baker, 369 U.S. at 204.
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It emphasized that these were "voters who allege facts showing
disadvantage to themselves as individuals.21 6  It also refused to
address plaintiffs' own claim that they represented "all other
voters, 21 7 a standard more consistent with the type of standing rule
we would see for claims involving a structural harm.218 In case the
Court's emphasis on the concreteness of the harms to the plaintiff
were insufficient, it resorted to the high-blown language of individual
rights to explain why it was not adjudicating "a claim of the right
possessed by every citizen to require that the government be
administered according to the law," which would involve intrusive
judicial action and few manageable standards.219 In the words of the
Baker majority, " 'the very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in
the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury.' "I' As this debate about judicial
capabilities and power continued in Reynolds,21 Wesberrytm and
Lucas, - the Justices in the Baker majority continued to employ
similar arguments, thereby cementing the Court's attachment to an
individualist conception of malapportionment claims. 4
The success of the Court's strategy in fending off Colegrove's
justiciability challenge suggests that an individual-rights framework
provided some security to Justices nervous about entering the
216. Id. at 206 (emphasis added); see also id. at 207 ("These appellants seek relief in
order to protect or vindicate an interest of their own.") (emphasis added).
217. Id. at 205 n.24.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 135,142-50.
219. Baker, 369 U.S. at 208 (internal quotations omitted).
220. Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,163 (1803)).
221. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
222. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). For example, in responding to the
Colegrove claim in Wesberry, the Court states that judicial intervention is appropriate here
because of the "power of courts to protect the constitutional rights of individuals from
legislative destruction." Id. at 6 (emphasis added). The Court similarly invokes
individualist language later by claiming, with little support, that "[tihe House of
Representatives... was to represent the people as individuals." Id. at 14.
223. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964). For example, in
response to the argument that a nonjudicial remedy existed in Lucas, the Court declined
to stay its hand on the ground that "individual constitutional rights cannot be deprived, or
denied judicial effectuation, because of the existence of a nonjudicial remedy .... An
individual's constitutionally protected right to cast an equally weighted vote cannot be
denied even by a vote of a majority of a State's electorate ... ." Id at 736.
224. See Guinier & Karlan, supra note 136, at 210 (arguing that the choice of equal
protection rather than the Guarantee Clause as the source of the right "situated
apportionment claims within an individual rights framework"); Issacharoff & Pildes, supra
note 79, at 1180 (linking the individualist strains of Reynolds to the Supreme Court's
efforts to distance the malapportionment cases from the Guarantee Clause); Lowenstein,
supra note 18, at 250-51 (same); McConnell, supra note 98, at 107 (same).
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political thicket. Perhaps such an approach offers nothing more than
a familiar intellectual framework. Perhaps the Court thought that an
individual-rights framework provided a well-developed set of
protections against judicial excess. Whatever the reason, the appeal
of that framework continues today, and we should expect the Court
to be quite cautious in adopting the structural arguments that are
often proposed by academics in the field.
CONCLUSION
This Article points up the complicated relationship between
minimalism's costs and its causes in voting cases. The Court's failure
to adopt an appropriate intermediary theory for explaining what
equality should mean in the one-person, one-vote cases stems, at least
in part, from the structural nature of the underlying claim.
Malapportionment claims-like many other voting claims-
incorporate assumptions about the way political structures should
aggregate votes, and most sensible intermediary theories would be
keyed to these assumptions.
Rather than make these assumptions an explicit part of its equal
protection jurisprudence in the malapportionment cases, the Court
has chosen not to endorse an adequate intermediary theory for the
malapportionment cases. It has instead offered a set of incompletely
theorized agreements rendered on a case-by-case basis, or, at best,
adopted a highly individualist theory of equality that is too thin to
deal with the conceptual puzzles Baker raised.
The Baker line thus provides a case study for evaluating
Sunstein's descriptive account of minimalism. It highlights potential
pitfalls to the minimalist approach not yet explored by other
commentators. One need not adhere to a highly philosophical, top-
down approach to lawyering to conclude that theory has a role to play
in judicial decisionmaking. From a pragmatic perspective,
incompletely or minimally theorized agreements may deprive courts
of the opportunity to articulate mediating principles that can cabin
judicial discretion, render doctrine more coherent, and avoid the trap
of inflexible rules or mechanically applied proxies. These cases thus
confirm Sunstein's own conclusion that minimalism does not
represent an appropriate strategy for every line of decisions and
supplement the criteria Sunstein has offered for predicting when
minimalism is unlikely to succeed.'
225. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 50, 57-58, 262-63. Sunstein argues that courts should
avoid minimalism when judges are confident in a solution's merits, when the solution
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At bottom, the problem with the Court's adoption of a
minimalist approach in the Baker line is that minimalism works only
when the Court can choose an outcome without choosing a mediating
theory. This is not a set of cases in which the Court could make
pronouncements about "outcomes" which did not "reflect[] rules or
theories laid down in advance. ' '11 6 Whether or not this strategy is
available to the Court in other areas, as Sunstein maintains, in the
one-person, one-vote cases the Court could not avoid making certain
structural assumptions about the right to vote and the aggregation of
groups when it rendered its decisions.
The Court's avoidance strategy-its failure to adopt any
mediating theory that might make those structural, group-based
assumptions more explicit-did not save it from making theoretical
judgments about the nature of the right to vote each time it handed
down a decision. It merely ensured inconsistent and incoherent
judicial outcomes.
In this respect, the causes of minimalism in the
malapportionment cases are intimately related to the resulting costs.
If, as this Article speculates, the Court has chosen a minimalist course
because it prefers the protections afforded by a conventional
individual-rights approach-well-established doctrines designed to
cabin and guide judicial discretion-then the Court's strategy has led
to an ironic result. That is because an individual-rights approach
without an adequate intermediary theory lends itself equally to
judicial abuse: significant doctrinal flips; the application of a rigid
formula for equality without an adequate justification for its
adoption; and a jurisprudence that conceals, but does not eliminate,
the structural assumptions behind it. All of these problems are
evident in Baker's progeny, and all raise the question whether the
minimalist game in voting cases is worth the candle.
reduces uncertainty, when advance planning is important, and when the solution supports
democratic goals. Id.
226. Id. at 9. Sunstein himself anticipates this possibility, as I have noted previously.
See supra note 17.
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